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 RESTRUCTURING A SOVEREIGN BOND 
PARI PASSU WORK-AROUND:  
CAN HOLDOUT CREDITORS 
EVER HAVE EQUAL TREATMENT? 
Natalie A. Turchi* 
 
The rise of vulture fund investing in sovereign bonds has created 
additional hurdles to successful restructuring in an already fragile ad hoc 
process.  Recent litigation in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina has proven 
courts’ willingness to utilize powers of equity to enforce a ratable payment 
interpretation of the pari passu clause—the equal treatment provision 
commonly found in sovereign bond contracts—creating much uncertainty 
on how the ruling will affect future restructuring efforts.  By looking to the 
tension in interpretations of the pari passu clause, discrepancies in 
remedial relief awarded, and international institutions’ proposed solutions, 
this Note analyzes the role of the pari passu clause as a tool for holdout 
creditors to disrupt restructurings.  This Note argues for a contractual 
solution targeted at preventing vulture fund investors from access to pari 
passu injunctive relief coupled with creative restructuring strategies for 
outstanding bonds awaiting maturity.  This resolution seeks to retain some 
protection for traditional holdout creditors while disincentivizing 
investments made with intent to derail restructurings from the start. 
Unlike debtors in the domestic bankruptcy system, sovereigns have no 
overarching mechanism to facilitate a successful restructuring when their 
debt burden becomes unsustainable.  Using the pari passu clause as a 
means to enjoin payment to restructured bondholders leaves sovereign 
debtors with little recourse but to cede to the demands of holdout creditors 
and can have a devastating long-term impact on the sovereign’s capacity to 
rebuild debt sustainability.  On the other hand, removing pari passu 
injunctive relief strips holdout creditors of a valuable enforcement 
mechanism and can leave sovereigns unrestrained.  This Note balances 
these concerns by advocating for a solution that diminishes vulture creditor 
leverage that can obstruct a restructuring, while otherwise preserving 
creditor rights against unfair or coercive exchange terms. 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Elliott School of 
International Affairs at George Washington University.  I give my sincerest gratitude to my 
advisor, Professor Caroline Gentile, for providing guidance and wisdom throughout this 
journey.  I would also like to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for contributing insightful 
comments to my work.  Lastly, I am forever indebted to my family for the unconditional 
support and unbridled enthusiasm they provide throughout all of my endeavors. 
2171 
 
2172 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2173 
I.   SOVEREIGN BONDS:  THE MARKET, THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS, 
AND THE RELEVANCE OF PARI PASSU .......................................... 2175 
A.   Sovereign Bond Basics .......................................................... 2175 
1.   Fundamental Concept Overview ..................................... 2176 
2.   Why Countries Issue Bonds ............................................ 2177 
3.   Market Size ..................................................................... 2178 
4.   History of Restructurings ................................................ 2179 
B.   Salient Features of the Restructuring Process....................... 2180 
1.   Absence of a Bankruptcy Regime ................................... 2180 
a.   Balancing Creditor and Debtor Interests .................. 2181 
b.   Creditor Coordination Problems .............................. 2182 
c.   Contracting with Collective Action Clauses and Exit 
Consents ................................................................... 2183 
2.   Role and Mechanics of Exchange Offers ........................ 2184 
3.   Holdout Creditors............................................................ 2185 
a.   Overcoming Sovereign Immunity in Enforcement .... 2186 
b.   Bond Contract Enforcement ...................................... 2186 
c.   Vulture Funds ............................................................ 2187 
C.   The Pari Passu Clause:  Inclusion in Sovereign Bonds and 
Strategic Use by Holdout Creditors in Restructurings ......... 2188 
II.   UNEQUAL TREATMENT FOR THE SAME PROVISION:  PARI PASSU’S 
DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS, REMEDIES, AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS ................................................................................... 2192 
A.   Court Interpretations ............................................................. 2192 
1.   Belgium ........................................................................... 2192 
a.   Birth of the Ratable Payment Theory ........................ 2193 
b.   The Aftermath of the Belgium Decision .................... 2194 
2.   New York ........................................................................ 2196 
a.   Interpretation of the Pari Passu Provision ............... 2197 
b.   Extending Injunctive Relief to Remedy Breach ......... 2198 
c.   U.S. Government Response and Aftermath ............... 2201 
3.   English Bonds and Interpretation .................................... 2202 
B.   Proposed Solutions:  Why Deeply Engrained Market 
Failures Bar a Simple Problem-Solving Mechanism ............ 2205 
1.   ICMA Solution ............................................................... 2205 
2.   IMF Solution ................................................................... 2206 
3.   ICSID Role ..................................................................... 2206 
4.   Implementation ............................................................... 2207 
III.   A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PARI PASSU .................................. 2208 
A.   Why Proposed Solutions Are Insufficient .............................. 2208 
B.   The Law As It Stands ............................................................. 2209 
C.   Limiting Vultures Without Disrupting Holdout Balance ....... 2210 
2015] SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE 2173 
1.   Infeasibility of a Sovereign Bankruptcy Structure .......... 2210 
2.   Contractual Solution ....................................................... 2211 
a.   Ninety-Day Presumption Proviso ............................. 2212 
b.   The Outstanding Bond Issue:  The “Plus” Factor .... 2213 
i.   Legislative Limitations Unlikely ......................... 2213 
ii.   Creative Interpretation:  Purposeful Avoidance . 2214 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2214 
 
INTRODUCTION 
A sovereign will go to great lengths to prevent the derailment of a debt 
restructuring that could result in economic disaster.  In September 2014, 
after a hearing before a New York federal court in NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Argentina,1 the sovereign nation of Argentina was found to be in civil 
contempt for proposing a bond payment system that was found to evade a 
payment structure mandated by court injunction.2  While it is extremely 
rare to hold a party in contempt,3 let alone a sovereign nation,4 courts have 
not shied away from employing their full arsenal of enforcement tools in 
sovereign debt litigation.5  Argentina’s actions were a result of its strategy 
to avoid a remedial order that conditioned payment to restructured 
bondholders on the full payment of principal and interest owed to holdout 
creditors, which Argentina claims would have grave economic 
consequences.6  The court’s power to provide such injunctive relief and 
grant the contempt order are both derived from the enforcement of one brief 
provision’s meaning:  the pari passu clause in the bond contract.7 
 1. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 2012 WL 
5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (establishing injunction); Order, NML Capital, No. 08 
Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014), ECF No. 687 (finding contempt for violating 
injunction). 
 2. Transcript of Hearing at 25:5–28:20, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 29, 2014), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/Argentine-
Sovereign-Debt/2014/Arg180-093014-e9t9repc.pdf; see also Amended and Supplemental 
Contempt Order at 3, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014), ECF No. 
693. 
 3. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 2, at 28:5–6 (explaining that “to hold a party 
in contempt of court is a rare thing”). 
 4. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 
31 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 208 (2014) (noting that the risk of contempt typically falls on third 
parties when a sovereign is enjoined). 
 5. See, e.g., Servaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, No. 09 Civ. 1862 (RMB), 2014 WL 
279507, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2014) (imposing $2,000 contempt sanction on Iraq for each 
day of failure to comply with discovery order); see also FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v. 
Democratic Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 377–79 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Autotech Techs. LP 
v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that courts are 
authorized to issue monetary contempt sanctions against foreign sovereigns as well as able to 
use any powers necessary to bring the suit to resolution). 
 6. See Brief of Defendant at 10–11, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
29, 2014), ECF No. 685; see also infra Part II.A.2. 
 7. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 195. 
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Different interpretations of the pari passu clause have sparked much 
debate on the role of holdout creditors, particularly vulture funds, in the 
sovereign debt restructuring process.8  Despite the small percentage of 
creditors who hold out in a restructuring,9 pari passu interpretation has 
overwhelmingly high economic stakes at play for two main reasons.  First, 
the numbers:  it is estimated that there is currently approximately $900 
billion in outstanding sovereign bonds that are affected by the 
interpretation.10  Second, the interpretation’s enforcement can unhinge a 
restructuring and impact third parties.11  In June 2014, the consequences of 
the court’s injunctions against Argentina reverberated loudly when the 
country found itself in a technical default on a $539 million interest 
payment to a class of restructured bondholders for failure to pay the $1.5 
billion due to holdouts.12 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously opined 
that “great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.”13  To determine whether 
the much-debated adage proves true with NML Capital, the case’s progeny 
and the bounds of stare decisis will test the breadth of its applicability.14  
Until that time, the multibillion dollar sovereign bond market governed 
under New York law requires that which the ruling cannot provide:  
certainty, predictability, and uniformity.15  Sovereign bond underwriters, 
issuers, and purchasers should therefore act now to prevent a sequel to the 
Argentine technical default disaster. 
It is unclear how broadly the rulings will be applied, and what their 
implications are for future sovereign bond restructurings where the 
underlying bond issuances contain similar language.16  Conflicting 
 8. Compare Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott 
Case:  A Brilliant Strategy But an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
39 (2011), with Robert A. Cohen, “Sometimes A Cigar Is Just A Cigar”:  The Simple Story 
of Pari Passu, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2011). 
 9. See Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010:  Literature 
Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 28 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), available 
at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26190.0 (finding that participation 
rates in exchange offers typically exceed 90 percent). 
 10. See Sean Hagan, Acting Collectively:  A Better Way to Restructure Government, 
IMFDIRECT (Nov. 24, 2014), http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2014/11/24/acting-collectively-a-
better-way-to-restructure-government-debt/. 
 11. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 215–16. 
 12. Camila Russo & Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Declared in Default by S&P As Talks 
Fail, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-
30/argentina-defaults-according-to-s-p-as-debt-meetings-continue.html. 
 13. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(finding that cases can be deemed “great” simply because their immediate interest creates a 
“hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful”); see also 
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. 
L. REV. 961, 965–69 (1998). 
 14. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 192. 
 15. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. Cf. Romain Zamour, NML v. Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation of 
the Pari Passu Clause, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 55, 63–65 (2013) (arguing that contrary 
to the general belief that the decision was widely applicable, it was actually narrow in 
scope). 
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understandings of the meaning of pari passu by market actors and under 
other governing laws suggest the potential for the New York decision to 
have broad and far-reaching consequences for permitting holdout creditors 
to block future restructurings.17  This uncertainty is underscored by the lack 
of a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism that mimics the oversight provided 
by the domestic bankruptcy system to ensure protections for both creditors 
and debtors such that neither abuses the system.18 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the sovereign bond market, 
the salient features of the restructuring process including the absence of an 
overarching bankruptcy regime, and the relevance of the pari passu clause, 
particularly its use by holdout creditors in sovereign bond restructurings.  
Part II begins with an examination of the conflicting judicial interpretations 
of the pari passu clause, the tensions in remedies that follow from those 
interpretations, and the reactions from various market actors and 
governments.  Part II then introduces and discusses several proposed 
approaches to preventing pari passu clauses from disrupting payment to 
exchange bondholders, which includes both contractual and sovereign 
bankruptcy regime solutions.  Part III suggests a contractual solution that 
would be easier to implement than a new bankruptcy regime.  This solution 
should be targeted at limiting remedies available to vulture funds that 
purchase bonds at the time the sovereign’s debt burden is already 
unsustainable or presumed unsustainable.  Finally, Part III addresses the 
complexities of the suggested contractual approach and the outstanding 
bonds whose contracts do not contain the new language. 
I.   SOVEREIGN BONDS:  THE MARKET, THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS, 
AND THE RELEVANCE OF PARI PASSU 
This Note begins by laying the groundwork for the pari passu debate by 
placing the provision in the context of the sovereign bond market generally.  
Part I.A provides background on the structure of the sovereign bond 
market’s size, reasons for countries to issue bond debt, and a history of 
restructurings.  Part I.B then addresses the important aspects of the 
restructuring process, discussing the lack of an oversight mechanism and 
the reason creditors hold out.  Part I.C introduces the equal treatment 
provision found in sovereign bonds, the pari passu clause, by explaining its 
relevance in bond restructurings and use by holdout creditors. 
A.   Sovereign Bond Basics 
The sovereign debt market is considered to be one of the oldest securities 
markets currently in existence, with “sovereign states . . . borrowing from 
 17. See infra Part II.A. 
 18. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?:  The Role of 
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1049 (2004). See generally 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 967 (2000). 
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time immemorial.”19  One way that sovereigns borrow money to finance a 
wide range of activities is through the issuance of sovereign bonds.20  A 
bond is “an obligation to pay a fixed sum of money, at a definite time, with 
a stated interest.”21  In its simplest form, a bond is a debt instrument that 
memorializes the debtor’s promise to pay back the principal sum received 
from the creditor, the interest amount on that principal, and the terms for 
payment of both.22  A bond indenture is a contract that outlines the bond’s 
face value, interest rate, maturity date, and other key features,23 making the 
terms enforceable under the governing contract law.24  This section begins 
with an overview of bond terminology followed by a discussion of the 
reasons for and benefits of structuring sovereign debt in bonds, the scope of 
the market, and background on sovereign debt restructurings. 
1.   Fundamental Concept Overview 
The actual bond terms that go into an offering are determined by a host 
of complex factors that vary by issuing country.25  A sovereign will decide 
the bonds’ maturity,26 i.e., whether to issue short-term or long-term bonds, 
based on internal factors and a mix of market factors that include demand 
and bond yield.27  Bond yields are determined by a combination of country-
specific factors, international factors, and investor risk preference.28  
Additionally, the way a country structures its bond debt depends on whether 
the primary target for borrowing is to raise domestic or external debt.29 
External debt is debt that is issued under foreign law and denominated in 
foreign currency.30  Historically separate debt instruments were issued for 
foreign investors and domestic residents, but the loosening of international 
capital markets has allowed both types of creditors to invest in both types of 
 19. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION 18 
(2013). 
 20. See generally id. at 18–30. 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (10th ed. 2014). 
 22. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1324, 1329 (2002). 
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (10th ed. 2014). 
 24. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992); see also 
infra Part I.B.2 (discussing holdout creditor enforcement litigation). 
 25. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 24. 
 26. The date of maturity is the date when the total bond debt becomes due. BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 478 (10th ed. 2014).  This encompasses the entirety of the payment 
obligation to the creditor. See id. (defining “maturity value”). 
 27. Fabrizio Zampolli, Sovereign Debt Management As an Instrument of Monetary 
Policy:  An Overview, in THREAT OF FISCAL DOMINANCE? 102, 110 (2012), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap65f_rh.pdf.  Internal factors for sovereign preference 
include desired levels of liquidity and whether there is a stronger desire to reduce risk of 
raising taxes in the future (long-term bonds), or to reduce interest payments (short-term 
bonds). Id. 
 28. See Blaise Gadanecz, Ken Miyajima & Chang Shu, Exchange Rate Risk and Local 
Currency Sovereign Bond Yield in Emerging Markets 2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working 
Paper No. 474, 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work474.pdf. 
 29. See generally Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt:  The 
Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 795 (2004). 
 30. Id. 
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bonds.31  The diversified debt composition has created a unique set of legal 
characteristics that raise concerns about inter-creditor equity in the 
treatment of foreign and domestic creditors, particularly in the event of 
financial crisis.32 
The majority of sovereign bonds are external debt.33  This is especially 
true for emerging market bonds that benefit from the economic stability of 
issuing bond debt under a foreign currency and can attract more investors if 
the bond terms are enforceable under foreign law.34  This Note focuses on 
sovereign bonds that are issued as external debt.  The majority of external 
debt is issued under and governed by New York or English law.35  These 
courts are therefore the most significant in their ability to interpret and 
enforce the terms of the bond contract.36 
2.   Why Countries Issue Bonds 
Countries enter the sovereign debt market for access to capital—
frequently from foreign creditors.37  Their reasons for borrowing can range 
from the need to fund daily expenditures to financing infrastructure projects 
and wars.38  Although a sovereign can choose to structure its debt through 
different types of debt instruments,39 the economic classification40 and 
credit rating of a country can inform the financing options available to it.41 
 31. Id. at 796. 
 32. Id.; see also infra Parts I.C, II.A (discussing the relevance of intercreditor treatment 
and external indebtedness). 
 33. See Das et al., supra note 9, at 41 (“Typically, international bonds are issued under 
foreign laws.”). 
 34. See Elmar B. Koch, Collective Action Clauses:  The Way Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 665, 668 (2004) (noting the particular importance of foreign jurisdiction issuance for 
emerging market economies); cf. Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The 
Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings 5 (Jan. 22, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205704 (discussing debt 
issued under domestic laws where the sovereign has the direct ability to change laws that 
alter their obligations under the debt instrument in the event of a debt crisis).  Greece used 
this strategy during its recent restructuring for the 93 percent of bonds that were governed 
under Greek law. Id. 
 35. HOLGER SCHIER, TOWARDS A REORGANIZATION SYSTEM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT 12 
(2007); see also Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 302 (2005) (noting that the largest portion of emerging market debt 
is governed under New York law).   
 36. See generally infra Part II.A. 
 37. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 18. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Cf. Das et al., supra note 9, at 14–18 (discussing differences between bilateral and 
bank debt in the restructuring context).  A debt is a “specific sum of money due by 
agreement or otherwise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (10th ed. 2014). 
 40. Countries are categorized as either advanced or developing/emerging market 
economies. See IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK REPORT 162–66 & tbl.A (2014), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/pdf/text.pdf. 
 41. See Donato Masciandaro, Sovereign Debt:  Financial Market Over-Reliance on 
Credit Rating Agencies, in SOVEREIGN RISK:  A WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS? 58 
(2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72j.pdf.  Ratings also affect the 
prices of government bonds, and therefore affect bond yields and margins. Id. 
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For a country to engage in long-term financing through international 
capital markets, sovereign bonds are one of the most important 
mechanisms.42  For sovereigns, bonds provide much more flexibility by 
allowing longer maturities and less restrictive covenants than other types of 
financing such as loans from commercial banks.43  Bonds are also more 
easily traded on stock exchanges and have less complicated clearing and 
settlement procedures.44  For investors, bonds are attractive because credit 
ratings make risk assessment, pricing, and trading more accessible.45  This 
in turn means that the sovereign bond market creates access to more foreign 
investors and therefore a larger source of capital.46 
An increase in bond issuances began largely in response to the banking 
crisis in the 1980s that made other forms of financing unavailable or 
difficult to obtain.47  Although the initial shift was seen as temporary, the 
sovereign bond market began to grow in response to the realization of the 
many benefits bond financing provided, particularly for emerging market 
countries.48  Since the 1990s, bonds have become the primary source of 
financing to emerging market economies.49  Although advanced economies 
generally enjoy a wide variety of financing options,50 they also hold an 
increasing percentage of their debt in sovereign bonds.51 
3.   Market Size 
The widespread use of sovereign deficit financing with bonds has made 
capital markets more efficient and diversified.52  It should therefore come 
as no surprise that the sovereign bond market holds trillions of dollars in 
value.  It is estimated that in the third quarter of 2014 alone, Eurobond 
trading (foreign currency–denominated bonds) was valued at $597 billion.53  
 42. RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
105 (2010). 
 43. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1068. 
 44. Id.  The clearing and settlement procedures relate solely to the instrument trading 
transaction and not to the settlement of claims in the event of a default, which is discussed in 
greater detail in Part I.B. 
 45. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1068–69. 
 46. Cf. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract:  A Case Study, 
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632–33 (2006) (contrasting emerging market economy access 
to capital with developed economies that have “well-established domestic financial systems, 
steady access to domestic and international investors, and the capacity to issue debt in their 
own currencies”). 
 47. See id. at 1633–34 (noting the shift from bank loans to bonds following a wave of 
loan defaults); see also infra Part I.A.3, I.B (discussing Brady Bonds and how the changing 
composition of sovereign debt has impacted restructurings). 
 48. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1067 & nn.116–18. 
 49. Id. at 1069. 
 50. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1633. 
 51. See Masciandaro, supra note 41, at 50 & n.2 (noting that government bonds for 
advanced economies have increased from 75 percent to 110 percent of GDP). 
 52. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 152. 
 53. Press Release, Emerging Mkt. Trade Ass’n, EMTA Survey:  Third Quarter 
Emerging Market Debt Trading at $1.454 Trillion 2 (Dec. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.emta.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9168. 
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One figure for government bonds in 2000 found that for thirty-five 
countries assessed, there were $608 billion in outstanding foreign currency 
sovereign bonds,54 and by 2008, bonds for long-term public external debt 
totaled $1.4 trillion.55 
4.   History of Restructurings 
A sovereign that no longer has the ability to support its debt obligations 
will seek to regain debt sustainability by restructuring its payment 
obligations as part of a bond exchange.56  The mechanics of this process are 
outlined in Part I.B.2. 
There was a resurgence of sovereign bond restructurings following the 
Brady Plan in the mid-1990s.57  Under the plan, bonds were partly 
collateralized under the U.S. Treasury, which enabled them to become a 
tradable instrument.58  This system provided new capital influx to emerging 
economies and also had the effect of creating a liquid secondary bond 
market.59 
The introduction of Brady bonds also marked a great shift in creditor 
lending.60  Before the 1980s, sovereign lending was done primarily by 
syndicated bank loans.61  Once the Brady Plan provided an outlet for 
emerging market economies to restructure their unsustainable debt—held 
primarily in the form of syndicated loans—by exchanging it with bonds, the 
majority of emerging market debt held by private investors shifted to bonds 
from commercial loans.62 
While this bond structure seemed to benefit emerging market economies 
overall and led to an increase in foreign capital investing in those countries, 
the system created some new default risks that threatened debt 
sustainability for participating countries.63  The default risks eventually led 
 54. Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel & Sergio L. Schmukler, Government Bonds in 
Domestic and Foreign Currency:  The Role of Institutional and Macroeconomic Factors, 15 
REV. INT’L ECON. 370, 376 & fig.3 (2007). 
 55. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Government 
Debt 5 & fig.1 (UN, Working Paper No. 199, 2010), available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20103_en.pdf. 
 56. See Das et al., supra note 9, at 7. 
 57. Id. at 32. 
 58. See id. at 18. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text. 
 61. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 105.  Syndicate loans are loans that are 
provided by institutional lenders. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1679 (10th ed. 2014) 
(defining syndicate as “[a] group organized for a common purpose; esp., an association 
formed to promote a common interest, carry out a particular business transaction . . . .”).  
Syndicate loans and commercial bank loans are used interchangeably. 
 62. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 105–06. 
 63. Das et al., supra note 9, at 18.  The default risks were mainly caused by the way 
interest payments were structured, which threatened the debt sustainability of the debtor 
countries. Id. 
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to Brady Bond defaults in several countries, precipitating another bond 
restructuring in those cases.64 
From 1998 to 2010, there were seventeen distressed sovereign bond 
restructurings.65  During that same period, there was an increase in the 
number of restructurings that involved a reduction in the restructured 
instruments’ face value.66  The majority of deals in the 1990s and 2000s 
came with an implied debt write-down, which was not the case before.67 
B.   Salient Features of the Restructuring Process 
This section provides a framework for understanding the ways a 
sovereign bond restructuring can become susceptible to disruption.  
Part I.B.1 discusses how the lack of a sovereign bankruptcy regime impacts 
the terms of restructuring as compared to one conducted under a domestic 
bankruptcy system.  Part I.B.2 outlines the mechanics of exchange offers.  
Part I.B.3 then discusses holdout creditors and their role in the process.  
1.   Absence of a Bankruptcy Regime 
As compared to the robust system established to oversee domestic 
bankruptcy,68 there is no central authority to facilitate restructuring 
following a sovereign default.69  Despite various proposals for creation of 
judicial oversight, global statutory schemes have failed to be 
implemented.70  Therefore, restructuring is conducted on an ad hoc basis, 
addressing individual concerns case-by-case.71  This system has many 
problems and can make for a process plagued by inefficiency and 
unpredictability.72  This section addresses distinguishing features of the 
sovereign restructuring process that result from the absence of a bankruptcy 
regime. 
 64. Id.  One country that required a Brady Bond restructuring was Peru. See infra notes 
210–11 and accompanying text. 
 65. Das et al., supra note 9, at 33. 
 66. Id. at 34. 
 67. Id.  This trend can be attributed in part to worldwide debt relief initiatives as well as 
changes in the administration of bond restructuring. Id. 
 68. See Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 
1095, 1098 (2013). See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012) (demonstrating the 
thoroughness of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code). 
 69. See In re Bd. of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 307 B.R. 384, 392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“[A] sovereign cannot file an insolvency case, and there are no recognized 
proceedings available to prevent holders of debt . . . from pursuing their claims against a 
sovereign debtor.”); see also Eugenio A. Bruno, Fundamentals of Sovereign Debt, in 
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DEBT RESTRUCTURING 5 (Eugenio A. Bruno ed., 2013). 
 70. See generally Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for 
Sovereigns:  A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002).  The largest 
hurdle appears to be “substantial disagreement on which approach is the best.” Id. at 499. 
 71. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 104. 
 72. See generally Molly Ryan, Sovereign Bankruptcy:  Why Now and Why Not in the 
IMF, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2473 (2014). 
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a.   Balancing Creditor and Debtor Interests 
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a comprehensive system of 
protections for both debtors and creditors, which proponents of a statutory 
approach to sovereign restructuring have sought to emulate.73  Although 
attempts to create such a system have been unsuccessful, examining certain 
protections in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, particularly corporate 
restructuring under Chapter 11, can provide a useful though imperfect 
metaphor to understanding process failures in sovereign debt 
restructuring.74 
When applying bankruptcy principles to sovereigns, Chapters 9 and 11 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which outline the reorganization of insolvent 
municipalities and corporations, respectively, are therefore most frequently 
viewed for comparison.75  In understanding the analogy of commercial debt 
to sovereign debt, several key distinguishing features must be noted.76  
First, the inability to evaluate the debtor’s actual financial condition means 
that it is difficult for creditors to determine when a sovereign is actually 
unable to pay its debts as opposed to engaging in an opportunistic default.77  
Even where the default is legitimately the result of unsustainable debt, the 
lack of financial transparency means that creditors can still become 
vulnerable to unreasonable restructuring terms.78 
Second, under the domestic system, U.S. bankruptcy courts play a large 
role in balancing the concerns of both debtors and creditors to effectuate 
fair and equitable results in the administration of bankruptcy.79  Once a 
debtor is in bankruptcy, there are a host of protections that become 
available.80  Particularly necessary to successful reorganization for the 
debtor are:  (1) the issuance of an automatic stay,81 (2) the debtor-in-
possession’s access to financing,82 and (3) the ability of a court to confirm a 
binding reorganization plan despite creditor objection.83  Creditors also 
have a number of ways to ensure that their interests are protected, 
 73. See ANNE O. KRUEGER, IMF, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT 
RESTRUCTURING 10–20 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf. 
 74. See id.; see also SCHIER, supra note 35, at 37–44. 
 75. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012) (chapter 9); id. §§ 1101–1174 (chapter 11); see 
also SCHIER, supra note 35, at 37. 
 76. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1045. 
 77. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual 
Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (outlining the broad power of the court). 
 80. See SCHIER, supra note 35, at 37–44. 
 81. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922. 
 82. See id. § 364. 
 83. Cf. In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 513 B.R. 233, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(noting that a reorganization plan “may still be confirmed [by the court] over the rejection of 
a class of claims or interests” under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) if it meets the other criteria in 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a) save for affirmative consent of all impaired parties). 
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including:  (1) the implementation of creditors’ committees,84 (2) court 
review of reorganization plans for fairness,85 and (3) rules such as 
preference avoidance that prevent creditors from receiving an unfair priority 
in payment.86  In the absence of these formal procedures to safeguard 
creditor and debtor interests, the leverage each brings to the negotiating 
table can dictate the restructuring’s success.87 
b.   Creditor Coordination Problems 
One of the major downsides of the diversification of sovereign bond 
creditors is that it creates coordination problems in restructuring.88  Bonds 
are held by a wide range of entities including:  banks (large commercial, 
small commercial, local, and investment), pension funds, mutual funds, 
hedge funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors.89  The wide 
dispersion of creditors, coupled with the fact that many bond purchases are 
made on the secondary bond market, makes it more difficult to identify 
major bondholders during a restructuring than with bilateral or syndicate 
loans, which are more concentrated.90 
Even if creditors can be identified, they can be difficult to coordinate 
because they are increasingly numerous.91  For example, there were 
100,000 retail investors affected by the 2000 Ukraine bond restructuring 
and 600,000 impacted by the 2005 Argentine debt restructuring.92  The 
varying concerns and interests represented by creditors can severely inhibit 
restructuring efforts and have become more problematic in recent years as 
the composition of sovereign debt issued in bonds increases.93  Such a 
diffuse group of creditors particularly creates the risk of a collective action 
 84. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102–1103 (noting the broad powers and duties of creditor committees 
in monitoring and participating in reorganization). 
 85. Id. § 943(b)(7) (municipal bankruptcy “best interest of creditors” standard); id. 
§ 1129(a)(2) (three-part fairness test for chapter 11); see also William W. Bratton & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38–
41 (2004) (discussing differing fairness standards for court review of a reorganization plan 
under U.S. Bankruptcy Code for protection of creditors). 
 86. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).  A debtor is presumed insolvent on and during the ninety days 
prior to the bankruptcy petition filing. Id. § 547(f).  A trustee in bankruptcy can avoid any 
transfer of the debtor’s property that was made (1) for the benefit of a creditor (2) on account 
of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made (3) while the debtor 
was insolvent (4) on or during the ninety days prior to filing for bankruptcy (5) that allows 
the creditor to receive more than the creditor would from a chapter seven liquidation if the 
transfer was not made and the creditor had received payment to the extent permitted by the 
Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 547(b). 
 87. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 85, at 24–25. 
 88. See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 152. 
 89. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1070. 
 90. Das et al., supra note 9, at 13, 17. 
 91. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 152. 
 92. Das et al., supra note 9, at 21. 
 93. Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt:  A Creditor’s 
Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 180 (2003). 
 
2015] SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE 2183 
problem, which in turn can elicit a delay in restructuring from sovereigns to 
ensure maximum participation.94 
c.   Contracting with Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents 
To make restructuring more efficient, parties have sought to compensate 
for the lack of a bankruptcy system by including detailed contractual 
provisions,95 including collective action clauses96 (CACs) and exit 
consents.97 
CACs address the issue of creditor coordination and prevent a minority 
of creditors from manipulating the restructuring process for their own 
benefit.98  They accomplish this by specifying the supermajority percentage 
of creditors necessary to alter payment obligations on the bonds that 
become binding on all bondholders.99  Under English law, CACs were first 
used as far back as 1879 and are a “regular feature” of both corporate and 
sovereign bonds today.100  Although New York bonds only adopted the 
same standard starting in 2003,101 CACs have been broadly incorporated in 
sovereign bonds since then.102  Today, CACs are standard in all sovereign 
bonds.103 
For New York law bonds issued prior to 2003, unanimous action clauses 
(UACs) are standard.104  UACs require unanimous bondholder approval to 
modify any terms of principal or interest payment.105  To counterbalance 
the problem of dissident creditors in bonds that contain UACs, exit consents 
are seen as a valuable alternative to CACs.106  Exit consents make 
acceptance of an exchange offer conditional on the creditor’s consent to 
amend certain nonpayment terms of the original bond.107  Even under a 
UAC, nonpayment terms generally can be modified with a majority or 
supermajority.108  Modifying various nonpayment terms of the original 
bond to reduce its value will therefore persuade exchange offer acceptance 
if the retention of the bond becomes less attractive to investors.109 
 94. KRUEGER, supra note 73, at 1. 
 95. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 28. 
 96. Id. 
 97. SCHIER, supra note 35, at 20. 
 98. Koch, supra note 34, at 667. 
 99. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 111–13.  Majority action clauses technically 
denote a subset of CACs, but for purposes of this discussion, the terms will be used 
interchangeably. See id. 
 100. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 22, at 1325. 
 101. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 116. 
 102. See Koch, supra note 34, at 665–66. 
 103. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 24, 28. 
 104. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts:  An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 932–33 (2004). 
 105. Id. at 932. 
 106. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1090–92. 
 107. Id. at 1091. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.  The bond restructurings of Ecuador in 2000, Uruguay in 2003, and the 
Dominican Republic in 2005 are examples of successful restructurings that used exchange 
offers coupled with exit consents. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Clause in 
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2.   Role and Mechanics of Exchange Offers 
During a sovereign bond restructuring, outstanding bonds110 are 
exchanged for cash or new bonds through a legal process.111  Under the 
exchange, the payment terms of new bonds are designed to resolve the debt 
crisis episode.112  This is achieved either by extending the maturity on the 
bond (“debt rescheduling”), by reducing the face value of the principal or 
interest rate (“debt reduction”), or a combination of both.113  In the sixty 
years from 1950 to 2010, there have been more than six hundred 
restructurings that span over ninety-five countries.114 
When the restructuring occurs in the wake of a sovereign debt crisis, it 
implies a debt exchange with terms that are less favorable than the terms on 
the original bond due to the sovereign’s inability to pay.115  The amount by 
which the original instrument’s face value is decreased is called a 
haircut.116  This type of restructuring is referred to as a distressed debt 
restructuring.117 
The restructuring process is triggered by either a default (in the case of a 
post-default restructuring) or by an announcement of a restructuring (in the 
case of a preemptive restructuring).118  Following the default or 
announcement, the negotiation period commences.119  Throughout the 
negotiation period, which can take anywhere from several months to several 
years, the terms of the debt exchange are determined.120  During this time, 
the sovereign will typically announce its fiscal and debt management plans 
in conjunction with a macroeconomic adjustment program as well as an 
Sovereign Debt Instruments:  Developments in Recent Litigation, in SOVEREIGN RISK:  A 
WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS?, supra note 41, at 122, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72u.pdf. 
 110. Outstanding bonds are bonds that have not yet reached maturity and are therefore 
unpaid debts. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (10th ed. 2014). 
 111. Das et al., supra note 9, at 7. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  A debt rescheduling occurs when the maturity period on the bond is extended, 
which can yield lower interest rates. Id.  A debt reduction occurs when there is a reduction in 
the face or nominal value from the original instruments to the exchanged instruments. Id. 
 114. See id. at 30–32. 
 115. Id. at 7 (citing definition by Standard & Poor’s (2006)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 8. 
 118. Id.  Greece is an example of the largest preemptive restructuring. See IMF, 
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 6, 22 (2013), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf (noting that Greece’s €205 billion 
debt restructuring in February 2012 was the “largest sovereign debt restructuring in 
history”).  Other countries such as Jamaica, Belize, Dominican Republic, and Grenada have 
also restructured preemptively. Id. at 22.  IMF policy encourages member countries to 
initiate a preemptive restructuring rather than wait until default so that the country can 
continue to service its original claims during the restructuring process. Id. at 11.  The 
importance of avoiding a default is to prevent “exacerbat[ing] the immediate economic and 
financial dislocation” and to not interfere with a sovereign’s ability to re-access international 
private capital. Id. 
 119. Das et al., supra note 9, at 13. 
 120. Id. at 12–13. 
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overall evaluation of its financial situation.121  Following the negotiation 
period, an exchange offer is prepared by the government and presented to 
creditors, at which point the creditors can choose to accept or reject the 
offer.122 
The offer period presents the most difficulty for creditor coordination and 
risk of holdouts.123  Often, a sovereign will make an exchange contingent 
upon acceptance by a minimum number of creditors to ensure a successful 
exchange.124  Following the exchange offer period, the debt exchange takes 
place.125 
One successful method to incentivize bondholder participation in a 
sovereign bond restructuring has been through the use of legal or financial 
“sweeteners.”126  The practice of using sweeteners to entice participation is 
widespread, and there are a number of creative options that sovereigns have 
used to increase participation rates.127  In fact, actual participation rates 
surpassed 90 percent in most recent sovereign bond exchanges.128 
3.   Holdout Creditors 
Due to the voluntary nature of the restructuring process, creditors may 
reject the terms of the exchange offer and “hold out” for the possibility of 
receiving better repayment value or even the full face value of the bond.129  
Holdout creditors have the right to enforce the obligations of the original 
bond under contract law.130  In negotiating the terms of an exchange offer, 
creditors can therefore leverage their right to seek judicial enforcement as 
both a protection against unfair restructuring terms or opportunistic default 
and to receive better repayment terms.131  Given the high costs of sovereign 
debt litigation and the difficulty of enforcing judgments against sovereigns, 
holdout litigation traditionally has not been an effective recovery 
method.132  However, recent strategies employed by a type of holdout 
creditor known as a vulture fund have created an increase in holdout 
litigation and strengthened the role of holdouts in the restructuring 
process.133 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 13. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 109, at 122.  Some examples of contractual sweeteners 
include a most favored creditor clause, mandatory prepayment clauses/mandatory 
restatement of principle clauses, credit-linked notes, a guarantee, use of principal defeasance, 
or use of collateral. Id.  The specifics of these contractual sweeteners are beyond the scope of 
this Note. 
 127. See id. 
 128. Das et al., supra note 9, at 26. 
 129. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1045. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 45 (describing litigation against a sovereign as 
“largely a fruitless exercise”). 
 133. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1089–90. 
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a.   Overcoming Sovereign Immunity in Enforcement 
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act134 (FSIA), a foreign state is 
presumptively granted jurisdictional immunity unless one of the 
enumerated exceptions applies.135  Most courts interpret the issuance of 
public debt to fall under the commercial activity exception, barring 
sovereign immunity defenses in sovereign debt cases.136  Sovereigns also 
frequently waive their immunity by consenting to U.S. court jurisdiction in 
their bond contracts.137  This means that the FSIA is not a significant 
barrier for holdout creditors seeking to obtain a judgment, although it still 
remains extremely relevant for attachment proceedings to enforce the 
judgment.138 
The act of state doctrine and international comity are two other potential 
sources of limitations on creditor recovery.  Courts have declined to apply 
the act of state doctrine to cases of sovereign debt contract breach.139  New 
York courts in particular have long understood that foreign sovereigns 
acting in a commercial capacity are not afforded judicial abstention because 
the sovereign action is not analogous to an act of state, for which judicial 
scrutiny would be seen as “affronting their sovereignty.”140  Likewise, 
international comity has not provided reprieve for sovereign debtors.141 
b.   Bond Contract Enforcement 
In the Unites States, contract rights are considered so fundamental that 
their protection against impairment is explicitly stated in the U.S. 
 134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012). 
 135. Id. § 1330 (granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts for any claim 
where a “foreign state is not entitled to immunity” under §§ 1605–1607 or other applicable 
international agreements). See generally id. §§ 1602–1611. 
 136. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992); see 
also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activity exception from immunity); Fisch & 
Gentile, supra note 18, at 1076. 
 137. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d 47, 48 
(2d Cir. 1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (explicit or implied waiver exception to 
sovereign immunity); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1076. 
 138. Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir. 
2011) (finding “execution immunity afforded sovereign property is broader than the 
jurisdictional immunity afforded the sovereign itself” under 28 U.S.C. § 1609); see also 
Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation:  
Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 57 (2010). 
 139. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 
522–23 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 140. See Mirabella v. Banco Indus. de la Republica Argentina, 421 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962–63 
(Sup. Ct. 1979) (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 
703 (1976)). 
 141. See, e.g., Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 852 
(2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the use of comity to defer enforceability of debt would “violate 
United States policy”).  International comity is the deference given to foreign government 
acts by U.S. courts. Id. at 854.  Courts recognize the principle of international comity by 
declining to review foreign government acts, “allowing those acts and proceedings to have 
extraterritorial effect in the United States.” Id. 
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Constitution.142  Because state law governs contract disputes,143 the 
particular law governing a sovereign bond is crucial to the ability of a 
creditor to bring a claim against a sovereign debtor.144  For emerging 
market debt, the majority of outstanding bond issuances are governed by 
New York law.145  A study of forty-three emerging market countries 
conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that as of 
2009, $272 billion spread over 435 issuances fell under New York 
jurisdiction.146 
Litigation trends show that default-related lawsuits have been increasing 
despite the fact that the overall number of restructurings and defaults by 
sovereigns decreased in the same time period.147  There were 109 sovereign 
bond default or loan recovery cases filed against debtor governments in 
U.S. or English courts from 1980 to 2010.148  Recently, successes of 
holdout litigation have also provided incentives for holdout creditors to 
initiate recovery actions.149 
c.   Vulture Funds 
A subset of investors that specialize in trading distressed sovereign debt 
are called “vulture funds” for what some perceive as their predatory 
investing strategies.150  Vulture funds are institutional investors that 
purchase distressed bonds at a fraction of their face value in anticipation of 
a restructuring.151  They purchase sovereign debt on the secondary bond 
market when debt is traded at a steep discount due to an impending or 
 142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”). But see 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012) (U.S. Bankruptcy Code provision 
permitting, subject to court approval, special treatment of certain executory contract 
obligations in bankruptcy). 
 143. See, e.g., 82–11 Queens Blvd. Realty, Corp. v. Sunoco, Inc. (R & M), 951 F. Supp. 
2d 376, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 
 144. Das et al., supra note 9, at 41. 
 145. Id.  New York choice-of-law rules are unique in that parties can chose New York 
law to govern despite having no minimum contacts that would otherwise avail the parties of 
the jurisdiction of New York courts. IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., 982 
N.E.2d 609, 611–12 (N.Y. 2012).  Parties to a contract are permitted to choose New York 
state law to govern “whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a 
reasonable relation to this state” so long as the transaction covers at least $250,000. N.Y. 
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2013).  The New York legislature sought to 
“encourage the parties of significant commercial, mercantile or financial contracts to choose 
New York law” to maintain New York’s status as a commercial and financial center. IRB-
Brasil Resseguros, 982 N.E.2d at 611–12 (citation omitted). 
 146. Das et al., supra note 9, at 41–42.  This can be contrasted with EU nations, which 
were found to issue “more than 80 percent of their public bonds under their own [governing] 
laws between 2003 and 2010.” Id. 
 147. Id. at 51. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 50–51; see also infra Part II.A. 
 150. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 49. 
 151. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion:  The Problem of 
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207, 
1214 (1991). 
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actual default.152  When an exchange offer is then made, vulture funds 
exercise their right to hold out and bring suit for breach of contract.153  The 
fund can obtain a judgment and execute it against non-immune sovereign 
property under the FSIA154 or use the threat of judicial enforcement as 
leverage to negotiate highly profitable settlement terms.155 
Though problematic, vulture investments may provide benefits to the 
restructuring process and the capital markets.156  First, vulture funds serve 
to strengthen creditor protections by invoking the right to hold out and by 
serving as a check against opportunistic defaults and overly oppressive 
restructuring terms.157  Second, vulture funds provide liquidity to the 
distressed debt market that can encourage active market participation, 
benefiting retail investors.158 
Vulture funds are not unique to sovereign bonds.  In the corporate bond 
context, vulture funds became active about a decade before their investment 
strategies expanded into sovereign debt.159  The key difference is that 
domestic corporations can rely on bankruptcy courts to mitigate the 
debilitating effects of holdouts on a restructuring.160 
C.   The Pari Passu Clause:  Inclusion in Sovereign Bonds 
and Strategic Use by Holdout Creditors in Restructurings 
Pari passu is a Latin phrase that directly translates to “by equal step,” and 
means “[p]roportionally; at an equal pace; without preference.”161  In 
sovereign bonds, a pari passu clause, also called an equal treatment 
provision, acts as a financing constraint on sovereigns by claiming that the 
bond will “rank equally in right of payment with all other external 
indebtedness of the sovereign.”162  In bankruptcy, debtors may have 
multiple creditors who hold a variety of debt instruments at different 
payment priorities.163  The pari passu clause restrains a sovereign’s ability 
 152. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 49–50.  Latin American and African 
sovereigns have been recurring targets of vulture fund strategies mainly because of the 
market availability of their defaulted debt. Id. at 51. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 155. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 49–50. 
 156. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1047. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Compare Coffee, Jr. & Klein, supra note 151, at 1214 (discussing vulture funds as 
“a new player on the financial scene” in the 1991 domestic bondholder context), with Anne 
Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF, International Financial Architecture for 
2002:  A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm (raising concern in 2001 about 
the “aggressive legal strategy” being used by vulture funds as holdout creditors in sovereign 
restructuring). 
 160. See Coffee, Jr. & Klein, supra note 151, at 1209–10. 
 161. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (10th ed. 2014). 
 162. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 25; see also supra notes 29–34 and 
accompanying text (discussing external indebtedness). 
 163. See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 872–73 (2004). 
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to incur debt obligations that could subordinate the right of payment for the 
debt instrument containing the clause.164 
As a clause now deemed standard in sovereign bond issuances, pari passu 
has a long history of inclusion in sovereign debt instruments.165  The first 
evidence of a pari passu clause in an unsecured sovereign bond appeared in 
English bonds in 1902.166  The clause was increasingly included in 
unsecured sovereign bond issuances from 1940 through 2011, becoming 
ubiquitous after 2000.167 
Although there are variations in how the clause is drafted, a standard pari 
passu clause contains several common characteristics.168  As a central 
concept, the pari passu clause outlines the principle of equal treatment and 
defines how that principle is measured.169  The clause can contain a 
mandatory law exception that permits a debtor to enact laws related to its 
restructuring that do not legally interfere with the bond obligations.170  
Certain jurisdictions also have laws that might alter the operation of the 
clause by specifying preference to debt obligations in order of date of issue 
or by currency type.171  To counteract these laws, many clauses hold that 
“bonds are pari passu regardless of time of payment or currency of 
issue.”172  Lastly, the language in the clause varies based on the scope of 
creditor protection and can be narrowly worded to provide pari passu 
protection only to “external indebtedness” or, alternatively, broadly defined 
to encompass all unsecured creditors.173 
Despite these variations in the clause, sovereign bonds can be seen as 
highly standardized, with contracts “consist[ing] primarily of 
boilerplate.”174  Given the extensive history of sovereign borrowing, certain 
terms over time have become standardized boilerplate provisions.175  
Boilerplate provisions are believed to have a settled meaning, though the 
interpretation still relies on the governing law of the contract.176 
 164. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 104, at 990 (describing typical payment hierarchy in 
bankruptcy where legally senior and secured creditors have priority against a corporation’s 
assets and then unsecured creditors are treated equally among themselves as to remaining 
assets or payment). 
 165. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 109, at 121. 
 166. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 135. 
 167. Id. at 121–22 & tbl.3.  In a sample of 691 issuances from 2000 to present, 98.7 
percent had a pari passu clause. Id. 
 168. Id. at 63. 
 169. Id. at 63–66. 
 170. See id. at 67. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 67–68. 
 174. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2009).  The 
term boilerplate has been defined as “[r]eady-made or all-purpose language that will fit in a 
variety of documents [or] [f]ixed or standardized contractual language that the proposing 
party often views as relatively nonnegotiable.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (10th ed. 
2014). 
 175. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 2–4, 18. 
 176. See, e.g., GIUDITTA CORDERO-MOSS, BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW 353, 370 (2011) (“[T]erms of a contract 
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Under New York law, Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
N.A.177 is the controlling case for interpreting boilerplate terms.178  Under 
Sharon Steel, the interpretation of boilerplate bond contract provisions is a 
matter of law based on the market understanding.179  This is because the 
need for a consistent and uniform interpretation of boilerplate terms 
distinguishes those terms from “contractual provisions which are peculiar to 
a particular [bond contract].”180  The significance is that the actual 
contracted-for terms become irrelevant because the intended meaning is 
believed to transcend all transactions of the same type.181 
One of the main pushbacks on the boilerplate argument for pari passu 
clauses is that the clause did in fact undergo a series of changes in the mid-
1990s.182  Whereas the language of the clause was previously identical in 
all versions, pari passu clauses today can be grouped into three distinct 
categories based on the perceived litigation risk due to the language used in 
expressing the principle of equity.183  Whether or not the pari passu clause 
is categorized as boilerplate can therefore be significant in judicial 
interpretation, a concept that is explored at greater length in Part II.A. 
In addition to the sovereign bond context, equal ranking is also 
applicable to domestic bankruptcy proceedings.184  When a corporate entity 
is liquidated, creditors who rank pari passu will receive equal shares of the 
proceeds in what is called a pro rata distribution.185  Despite the prevalence 
of equal treatment in domestic bankruptcy, pari passu clauses of the type 
found in sovereign bonds rarely appear in domestic credit transactions.186  
This can be attributed to the fact that such equal treatment is implied in the 
Bankruptcy Code, and involuntary legal subordination of an existing 
creditor is forbidden.187 
are not detached from the governing law:  the governing law will influence the interpretation 
and application of these terms.”). 
 177. 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 178. See id. 1048–49; William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s 
Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 863–64 (2004) (explaining the “market 
understanding” standard of bond contract interpretation established by Sharon Steel). 
 179. Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. 
 182. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 121–22 & tbl.122. 
 183. See id. at 68, 122.  For a lengthy discussion of the clause’s litigation risks, see infra 
Part II.A. 
 184. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 25. 
 185. See id.  Pro rata distribution is a payment that is conducted “proportionately; 
according to an exact rate, measure, or interest.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1415 (10th ed. 
2014).  This analogy is imperfect for sovereign debt because a sovereign can never be 
liquidated. See Gelpern, supra note 68, at 1116–20. 
 186. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 873–74. 
 187. Id. at 873 & nn.6–7; see also supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (describing 
features of sovereign debt distinguishing them from domestic bankruptcy proceedings).  In 
addition to the prohibition of legal subordination, due to the function of the bankruptcy court 
and the ability to force a reorganization plan on unwilling creditors, no situation could arise 
where there would be an involuntary subordination in fact and not in law. See supra notes 
78–86 and accompanying text. But see 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2013) (enforcing subordination 
agreements). 
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A pari passu clause does not become operative until the sovereign lacks 
debt sustainability.188  Additionally, the pari passu clause is mostly relevant 
in a world with holdout creditors.  That is because if every bondholder 
agreed to the terms of the bond exchange, there would be no reason to 
inquire into the result on inter-creditor equities.189  The pari passu clause 
governs the relation of inter-creditor rights; however, after debt has been 
restructured, the status of unrestructured debt can be comparatively 
unclear.190 
In addition to the holdout collection strategies previously mentioned,191 
holdout creditors have used the pari passu clause as a legal basis for 
claiming contract breach. 
Following a bond exchange, a sovereign will begin making interest 
payments on the new debt instruments to the bondholders who participated 
in the restructuring.192  Subsequent to the restructuring, the sovereign no 
longer makes payments on the defaulted bonds retained by holdouts.193  
Holdout creditors then claim that interest payments on the new bonds 
violate the pari passu clause, arguing that the original bonds are not being 
treated equally to the new bonds.194  By invoking pari passu in this way, 
holdout creditors seek to disrupt payment on the restructured bonds by 
stopping interest payments until the equal treatment is restored.195  In 
bringing the claim under pari passu as a breach of contract, holdout 
creditors can attempt to receive injunctive relief with specific performance 
on the contract as a remedy.196 
This litigation strategy, which was pioneered by vulture fund investors, 
tethers the ability of a sovereign to make interest payments on restructured 
debt to the payment of obligations owed to holdouts under the original 
defaulted bonds.197  By doing so, the vulture fund can either be paid as a 
condition of payment to the exchange bondholders or it can use this 
injunctive relief as leverage to extract a profitable settlement.198  The use of 
this strategy has raised questions about the intended meaning of the pari 
passu clause and policy considerations relating to the debtor-creditor 
balance of power in a restructuring.199 
 188. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 874–76 & n.13 (noting that a lender who 
remains unpaid when other equally ranking creditors are current on payment would not be 
able to invoke pari passu as a legal grounds for relief if the borrower is still solvent). 
 189. See Yanying Li, Playing Sovereign Debt Creditors’ Orchestra:  Inter-Creditor 
Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 3 INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. 243, 251–53 (2013). 
 190. See id. 
 191. See supra Part I.B.3. 
 192. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 8, at 40. 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id. at 55–56. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Cohen, supra note 8, at 20. 
 197. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 55 (noting that “vulture funds invented what 
they believed could be a devastating enforcement device”). 
 198. Id. at 56. 
 199. These concerns are addressed in Part II. 
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II.   UNEQUAL TREATMENT FOR THE SAME PROVISION:  
PARI PASSU’S DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS, REMEDIES, 
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
This part looks at the judicial interpretations of pari passu, the remedies 
that these interpretations require, and the ways that international 
organizations and institutions have sought to decrease the potential damage 
that pari passu clauses can have on future sovereign debt restructurings. 
A.   Court Interpretations 
This section examines the judicial interpretations of pari passu clauses by 
courts in Belgium, the United States, and England, including remedies 
contemplated for pari passu breach under each jurisdiction.  This analysis 
will incorporate the question of whether there is also a standard industry 
usage understanding of pari passu, and how a characterization of pari passu 
as boilerplate might impact judicial interpretations. 
1.   Belgium 
In 2000, in Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion,200 a court 
interpreted a sovereign bond’s pari passu clause for the first time.201  Elliott 
sought a ruling from the Belgian Court of Appeals on interpretation of a 
pari passu clause under New York law when there was no controlling or 
otherwise even persuasive judicial precedent.202 
Prior to bringing the case in Belgium, Elliott had obtained a judgment in 
New York against the Republic of Peru following a sovereign bond 
default203 and was awarded over $52 million in addition to an award for 
compound interest calculated retroactively on that sum.204  Although an 
amended judgment lifted some of the restrictions on Elliott’s ability to 
attach property for the payment of the judgment against co-party Banco de 
la Nacion, execution against property for both parties was still “limited to 
 200. Elliott Assocs., L.P., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 8th Chamber 
Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.). 
 201. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 879. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 381 (2d Cir. 1999).  The 
decision held additional significance in finding that vulture fund investment strategies of 
purchasing with the intent to hold out are legally sound. See id. (determining the defense 
claiming violation of section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law is unavailable against 
creditors where, as with Elliott, the “‘primary goal’ is found to be satisfaction of a valid debt 
and its intent is only to sue absent full performance”); see also N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 489 
(McKinney 2004).  An amendment to N.Y. Judiciary Law section 489 that effectively 
eliminated the champerty defense for sovereign debt purchases in excess of $500,000 is said 
to be the result of vulture fund lobbying activity that convinced the New York state 
legislature to amend the statute.  Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 54. 
 204. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116, 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (awarding Elliott summary judgment against Peru for approximately $52 million plus 
interest and an additional approximated $23 million plus interest against Banco de la Nacion, 
a Peruvian bank). 
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property in the United States” under the FSIA.205  When the result of the 
attachment proceedings left Peru unable to utilize its U.S. payment agent 
for payment on its restructured bonds, Peru attempted to redirect its 
bondholder interest payments through a clearing system located in Brussels, 
Belgium.206 
a.   Birth of the Ratable Payment Theory 
Ratable payment means a proportionate and ratable distribution,207 also 
referred to as a pro rata payment.208  The argument under the ratable 
payment interpretation is that when the bonds were restructured, payment to 
the restructured class would violate the pari passu clause because there were 
no proportionate payments made simultaneously to the holdout creditors, 
therefore violating equal treatment.209 
Elliott used this argument to enforce its New York judgment in 
Belgium.210  In doing so, Elliott tried to intercept a payment that was 
scheduled for holders of the external bonds that Peru had issued to 
restructured creditors.211  First, Elliott tracked the payment method to 
determine which parties were involved in disbursement of interest funds to 
exchange bondholders.212  Elliott then served notices on all of the parties to 
restrain them from making payment to the exchange bondholders.213 
To gain judicial support for the strategy, Elliott filed an ex parte motion 
with the Commercial Court in Brussels to enjoin the payment-clearing 
agent from processing any of the payments received from Peru to pay the 
Brady Bonds.214  While the Commercial Court denied the motion, Elliott 
challenged the denial to the Appeals Court of Brussels, putting forth an 
argument based on a violation of the pari passu clause.215  The challenge 
alleged that the “Peruvian Republic attempts to make payments in violation 
of a principle of equal treatment (pari passu clause) among foreign 
 205. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, No. 96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 2000 WL 
1449862, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (finding the “FSIA’s exception to immunity from 
attachment—whether for foreign states or their instrumentalities—extends at most to 
property located ‘in the United States’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), (b))); see also supra 
notes 134–38 and accompanying text (discussing the FSIA limitations and property 
attachment following judgment). 
 206. Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:  
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253, 
257 (2003). 
 207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1451 (10th ed. 2014). 
 208. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for a definition of pro rata and discussion 
on intercreditor distribution. 
 209. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 877. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id.; see also Elliott Assocs., L.P., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 
8th Chamber Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.). 
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creditors, whereby Elliot Associates is excluded, and tries to use the [agent] 
to achieve that objective.”216 
To support the argument that pari passu would be violated if the Brady 
Bondholders were paid, Elliott submitted an affidavit from a U.S. law 
professor, who opined that “[a] borrower faced with a pari passu provision 
must pay all [creditors] on the same basis.”217  The professor believed such 
an understanding of pari passu was valid “whether that borrower is an 
individual, a company, or a sovereign state.”218  The affidavit did not cite 
any authority in support of these opinions.219 
On September 26, 2000, the Belgian Court granted Elliott’s motion to 
block the Brady Bond payment by enjoining the clearing agent and reversed 
the lower court decision.220  The significance of the Belgian Court decision 
could not be mistaken; the ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu 
clause was born.221 
Shortly after the ruling, Peru settled with Elliott for the full value of 
payment sought and avoided putting the Brady Bond payment in 
jeopardy.222  Although Elliott had purchased the bonds for approximately 
$11 million on the secondary market, in settlement it received in excess of 
$58 million, leading the fund to realize a profit margin of over 500 
percent.223  Though there is speculation as to why Peru did not seek to fight 
the injunction or negotiate further with the holdouts, the decision was left 
unchallenged.224 
b.   The Aftermath of the Belgium Decision 
Being the first court opinion to interpret the pari passu clause, the wake 
of the decision left many uncertain about the effect the specific ruling 
would have on the market.225  There were reports, statements, and articles 
that sought to address the impact of the decision by many who had an 
interest in the area of litigation—namely lawyers, academics, investment 
banks, and market groups.226  One academic noted that the ruling “became 
the catalyst for some of the most radical and far-reaching proposals for 
reform of the international financial system.”227  The question of what role 
vulture funds and holdouts play in sovereign debt restructuring sparked fear 
 216. Id. (as translated by Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 877). 
 217. Declaration of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld at 11–12, Elliott Assocs., L.P., General 
Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.) (executed Aug. 31, 2000). 
 218. Id. at 11. 
 219. See id.; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 878. 
 220. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 878–79. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id.  
 223. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 16. 
 224. Id. at 15–16 (citing political turmoil as a potential reason for inaction). 
 225. Id. at 47–49. 
 226. See id.  Years later there has still been discussion about the interpretation’s 
consequences. See generally Olivares-Caminal, supra note 8, at 43. 
 227. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 12.  Some of these proposals are addressed in 
Part II.B. 
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that injunctive remedies might have the potential to unravel sovereign 
restructurings and prevent sovereigns from reentering the markets following 
future restructurings.228 
One response came from the Belgian government itself.  Following the 
decision, the Belgian parliament sought to protect clearing systems from 
involvement in litigation that could disrupt payment to restructured 
bondholders by creating INC Belgian Law 4765 (C-2004/03482) in 
November 2004.229  The law did nothing to alter the interpretation of pari 
passu decided by the court, but it limited the enforcement ability of 
creditors by removing the type of injunctive relief that had been permitted 
in Elliott.230  Additionally, because Belgium is a civil law country, the pari 
passu interpretation in Elliott was not binding on future courts the same 
way it would be in a common-law system.231  In fact, the Court of Appeals 
in Brussels had another opportunity to hear a case on pari passu not long 
after the first one was decided.  In Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC 
Investments LLC, the court held in 2004 that payment on restructured bonds 
constituted a violation of the pari passu clause for failure to pay holdouts at 
a proportionate rate of payment but later reversed its decision on appeal.232 
Prior to LNC Investments, several other litigants had sought relief using 
the ratable payment pari passu interpretation applied in Belgium.  In 
California in 2001, a district court in Red Mountain Finance v. Republic of 
Congo233 decided that the plaintiff was permitted injunctive relief to enjoin 
payment of external debt without proportional payment to the holdout.234  
Despite the court denying specific performance of the pari passu clause, it 
found the same pari passu remedy appropriate to enforce other provisions of 
the credit agreement.235  However, a settlement was reached shortly 
 228. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 45–48 (discussing the newly perceived litigation 
risks and the consensus that Elliott “increased the probability of formal enforcement upon 
default”). 
 229. Loi modifiant les lois du service public fédéral finances [Act Amending Previous 
Laws for Federal Public Service Finance] of Nov. 19, 2004, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] 
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 28, 2004, 85,854; see also Olivares-Caminal, supra note 
8, at 52. 
 230. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 8, at 52. 
 231. Roozbeh B. Baker, Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Belgium:  A Critical 
Assessment, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 151 (2009) (“Belgian Courts are strictly 
limited to the application of legislation.  Court decisions naturally involve interpretation, but 
the interpretation is not precedent that is binding on future courts that must consider the 
same legislation.”). 
 232. See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 56–57; see also [Commercial Court] 
Bruxelles, Sept. 11, 2003, General Docket No. 240/RK/03, at 16–17, rev’d, Cours d’Appel 
[CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 9th Chamber Mar. 19, 2004, General Docket No. 
2003/KR/334 (Belg.). 
 233. Injunction Order, Red Mountain Fin., Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No. 
CV 00-0164 R (BQRx) (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001), ECF No. 123. 
 234. Id.; see also Andrea J. Boyack, Sovereign Debt and the Three and a Half Minute 
Transaction:  What Sticky Boilerplate Reveals About Contract Law and Practice, 35 
WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 25 n.127 (2013). 
 235. Injunction Order, supra note 233; see also OLIVARES-CAMINIAL, supra note 42, at 
87. 
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thereafter and the decision was repealed.236  In 2003, a court in England 
dismissed an appeal seeking injunctive relief for pari passu breach.237  A 
case alleging breach of pari passu in the New York Court of Appeals from 
the same plaintiff, Kensington International, Ltd., was dismissed on forum 
non conveniens grounds because the loan and agency agreements being 
litigated were governed by English and French law.238 
One of the characterizations of the pari passu clause as a boilerplate 
provision suggests that judicial interpretation makes the meaning difficult to 
change because subsequent interpretations will be determined as a matter of 
law.239  Additionally, speculation that the Elliott decision would invite 
more litigation on the ratable payment interpretation proved accurate.  One 
might assume that under these circumstances, a legitimate market response 
would be to change the language in the pari passu clause to reflect the 
“other” widely held interpretation for clarity if it was believed that the 
current language was merely faulty boilerplate.240  But, no such alteration 
occurred.241  There have been many factors that could explain the continued 
usage of the language without changing it.242  However, those factors 
remain mere speculation. 
2.   New York 
One result of the ratable payment interpretation was fear from debtor 
nations that the Elliott decision would inhibit their ability to restructure 
debt.  As a result, in 2003, the Republic of Argentina sought a declaratory 
judgment in Macrotecnic International Corp. v. Republic of Argentina243 to 
effectively nullify the precedential value for New York proceedings of the 
same type.244  Although the judge found that at the time there was a 
 236. See Stipulation and Order, Red Mountain Finance v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 
No. 2:00-CV-00164-MLR (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2002), ECF No. 238 (dismissing action with 
prejudice and vacating district court orders); see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 16 & n.29 
(stating orders subsequently vacated pursuant to settlement agreement). 
 237. Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 709, [2], [16] 
(Eng.); see also OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 87–88. 
 238. See Trial Order at 7–8, Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 602569/03 
(RBL), 2005 WL 5088276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  Jan. 11, 2005).  Forum non conveniens applies 
where the forum is inconvenient because “in the interest of substantial justice” another court 
or jurisdiction should hear the action.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 327 (McKinney 2013). 
 239. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pari passu 
clause as boilerplate and the significance for judicial interpretation when boilerplate is 
determined for bond contracts. 
 240. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 30–34. 
 241. Id. at 51 (alluding to deeply engrained market failures given the fact that in the wake 
of Elliott “the pari passu clause was not revised by the simple expedient of inserting 
clarifying language that would reduce if not eliminate the litigation risk”). 
 242. See generally id. at 33–44 (describing theories to explain the “stickiness” of contract 
boilerplate). 
 243. No. 02 Civ. 05932 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. filed July 26, 2002). 
 244. Motion for Order to Preclude Interference with Payments to Other Creditors, 
Macrotecnic Int’l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 05932 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
12, 2003), ECF No. 29 (seeking an order to preclude plaintiffs from interfering with 
payments to other creditors pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5240). 
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nonjusticiable issue as the question of pari passu breach was not yet ripe for 
adjudication at that time, the United States submitted a statement of interest 
indicating that the Elliott decision in Belgium was “a broad and novel 
interpretation of the pari passu clause.”245  The government stated that the 
forced simultaneous ratable payment to all creditors that would prohibit 
payment to third-party creditors would simply “undermine th[e] well-
understood established framework” that the government and international 
community had been operating under in sovereign debt restructurings and 
would “do damage to settled market expectations.”246  According to the 
standard market understanding, pari passu clauses serve to preserve only the 
equal legal ranking of obligations and therefore no violation is found where 
in practice some debt is excluded from restructuring.247  In fact, such 
exclusions are historically “common practice” given the realities of 
sovereign debt restructuring complexities.248  Because under this 
explanation pari passu does not require actual uniformity of treatment, it is 
understood to be interpreted narrowly and not to contemplate ratable 
payment in the event of partial restructuring.249 
It is rare that the United States submits a statement of interest amicus 
curiae, especially when unsolicited at the district court level.250  This 
highlights the significance of the interpretation from a policy standpoint.  
The government found that to uphold the Elliott interpretation would not 
only adversely affect U.S. interests, but that the judgment mechanism 
would not be consistent with the FSIA.251  The court did not have another 
opportunity to test the Elliott interpretation of pari passu until another 
vulture fund, NML Capital, a subsidiary to the management affiliate of 
Elliott, sought relief in the Southern District of New York. 
a.   Interpretation of the Pari Passu Provision 
In 2001, Argentina experienced the worst economic crisis the country 
had ever seen and defaulted on over $95 billion of external debt.252  The 
event was the largest sovereign default in history at the time.  Through 
exchange offers in 2005 and 2010, Argentina restructured its debt on bonds 
that were issued under a 1994 Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA).253  Ninety-
one percent of bondholders agreed to the exchanges (exchange 
 245. Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Macrotecnic Int’l Corp., No. 02 Civ. 
05932 (TPG), 2004 WL 5475206 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004), ECF No. 39; see also OLIVARES-
CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 89–90. 
 246. Statement of Interest, supra note 245, at 11. 
 247. Id. at 12–13; see also Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 55. 
 248. See Statement of Interest, supra note 245, at 11. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here to Help”:  Obtaining 
Amicus Support from the Federal Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 209, 223–24 (2009). 
 251. See generally Statement of Interest, supra note 245. 
 252. Mathias Audit, Sovereign Bonds and National Relativism:  Can New York Law 
Contracts Safely Cross the Atlantic?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 177, 179 (2014). 
 253. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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bondholders).254  The FAA was issued under New York law, and one of the 
holdout creditors, NML Capital, Ltd., sought recovery based on a breach of 
the pari passu clause.255 
In 2011, in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Judge Griesa in 
the Southern District of New York granted a motion for partial summary 
judgment and found that the pari passu clause was breached.256  While there 
was no mention of the term “ratable” in its opinion, the court found that the 
clause was violated when Argentina timely paid the exchange bondholders 
while “failing to pay the obligations currently due under NML’s Bonds.”257  
The pari passu clause in the FAA asserted that the debt obligations would 
not only rank pari passu among themselves, but that Argentina’s payment 
obligations would “at all times rank at least equally with all its other present 
and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.”258  The 
failure of simultaneous payment was therefore tantamount to lowering the 
rank of NML’s bonds by “relegating NML’s bonds to a non-paying 
class.”259  In addition to the finding that payment to exchange bondholders 
constituted a de facto rank subordination, the court found that Argentina 
had breached the pari passu clause by de jure rank subordination with the 
country’s legislative enactment of Laws 26,017 and 26,547.260  The laws 
were passed in conjunction with the exchange offers of 2005 and 2010, 
respectively, to entice participation by prohibiting settlement with holdout 
creditors who were eligible for participation in the exchange offers.261  In 
relevant part, Law 26,547 prohibited “more favorable treatment than what is 
offered to those who have not [sought to enforce the original terms of the 
bond contract].”262  The order did not permit injunctive relief for specific 
performance on the contract at that time.263 
b.   Extending Injunctive Relief to Remedy Breach 
Several months later, the court revisited the issue of enforcement and 
granted an equitable remedy for the pari passu clause breach, enjoining 
Argentina from making payments to the exchange bondholders without 
 254. Id.  The 2005 exchange garnered a 76 percent participation rate. Id. at 252.  It 
provided FAA bondholders with twenty-five to twenty-nine cents on the dollar for their 
exchange bonds. Id.  The 2010 exchange offer provided similar terms of restructuring to 
FAA bondholders and brought the number of participants up to 91 percent total. Id. at 253. 
 255. See generally id. at 254–56. 
 256. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 2011 WL 
9522565, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at *1 (quoting ¶ 1(c) of the 1994 FAA). 
 259. Id. at *2. 
 260. See id.; see also Law No. 26,547, Dec. 10, 2009, [CXVII] B.O. 31,798 (Arg.). 
 261. See NML Capital, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2.  Law 26,547, passed in 2009, suspended 
the effects of Law 26,017 for the time period of the 2010 exchange dealings. See id.; see also 
Law No. 26,547. 
 262. NML Capital, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2. 
 263. Id. at *3. 
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simultaneous ratable payments to NML.264  Like in the Elliott case,265 the 
injunction encompassed the third-party payment clearing agent, and 
Argentina was required to notify all such agents of the orders.266  
Additionally, the orders prevented Argentina from changing the payment 
transfer mechanism to avoid the judgment.267 
This time, instead of settling the dispute, Argentina appealed to the 
Second Circuit.268  Many academics and onlookers thought that the 
appellate court would overturn the decision.269  Instead, on appeal the panel 
unanimously affirmed the orders, but it remanded subject to clarification for 
how the payment formula was intended to function and the application of 
injunctions on third-party intermediaries.270  Argentina then sought a 
rehearing, where the United States again filed a statement of interest amicus 
curiae supporting Argentina to reverse what was categorized as an incorrect 
interpretation of the pari passu clause.271  The Second Circuit denied the 
rehearing petition.272 
The district court was then tasked with identifying the scope of the 
injunctive relief, a juncture that had never been reached in any previous 
court proceeding.273  In the November 2012 amended orders, the court 
noted that the exchange bondholders and FAA holdout creditors held debt 
instruments that were not of the same amount or of the same nature.274  
This is irrelevant for pari passu breach,275 however, because pari passu 
requires only that “obligations under the various debts are complied with to 
the same extent, rather than having the obligations on one debt honored and 
the obligations on the other debt repudiated, as has occurred in the present 
case.”276 
On remand, the district court was specifically tasked with clarifying how 
the payment to plaintiffs would operate as well as the function of the 
 264. Order at 3–4, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012).  
These orders were subsequently amended on November 21, 2012. NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 
6978 (TPG), 2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), appeal dismissed, (Sept. 23, 
2013), aff’d, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 265. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
 266. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *5. 
 267. Id. 
 268. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 269. See Zamour, supra note 16, at 59–60 (denoting various reactions of shock expressed 
in the aftermath of the Second Circuit’s decision). 
 270. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 250. 
 271. Brief for the United States of America As Amicus Curiae Supporting Argentina’s 
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012), ECF No. 653 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus 
Brief]. 
 272. Order, NML Capital, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 2013), ECF. No. 1035. 
 273. See, e.g., supra notes 232–46 and accompanying text (discussing cases that never 
fully litigated the pari passu issue to see an injunctive remedy utilized). 
 274. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *3. 
 275. Id. (“But it is obvious that a Pari Passu Clause does not require that the debts in 
question be in the same amount or of the same nature.”). 
 276. Id. 
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injunctions with respect to third parties, including intermediary banks.277  
The district court found that the relief provided under the injunctions would 
require Argentina to pay 100 percent of the debt owed to plaintiffs any time 
that Argentina seeks to pay 100 percent of what is owed to the exchange 
bondholders.278  This, the court stated, was the “straightforward” meaning 
of a “Ratable Payment.”279  In describing this straightforward meaning, the 
district court noted that the Second Circuit’s alternative hypothetical of 
ratable payment meaning280 would be a “radical departure . . . from the Pari 
Passu Clause.”281  No authority was provided to support this assertion. 
While the court’s order states that full compliance with the injunctions 
would require Argentina to pay the full sum of the $1.33 billion owed to the 
plaintiff creditors either concurrently or in advance of payment on the 
exchange bonds,282 Argentina claimed that instead of resulting in 
enforcement, the injunctions served to place approximately $24 billion in 
restructured debt at risk of default.283  In deciding that the injunctive 
remedy was appropriate, the court noted that while the original default was 
due to a legitimate financial crisis, Argentina was capable of making 
payments on both the exchange bonds and the holdout claims.284  There has 
been disagreement over the actual ability to pay, and the exact amount 
Argentina holds in reserves.285 
Proceedings continued to determine the precise bounds of the injunctive 
remedy.  The Second Circuit found that in addition to the FAA bonds, the 
injunctions span to “other obligations” such as GDP-linked securities in 
foreign currency based on the district court’s understanding of the FAA pari 
passu clause to rank not only other bonds but all other obligations 
 277. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2013), cert. denied sub nom. Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML 
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 278. See NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *3 (finding that a definition of pari passu 
meaning “proportionally” was “obviously referring to the use of the same proportion in 
paying down two kinds of debts.  This is clearly reflected in the Ratable Payment provisions 
in the Injunctions, as correctly interpreted.  These provisions properly start with the fact that 
if 100 [percent] of what is currently due to the exchange bondholders is paid, then 100 
[percent] of what is currently due to plaintiffs must also be paid”). 
 279. Id.  The entire opinion and order was written without a single citation to authority or 
case that supports this understanding of ratable payment. 
 280. The Second Circuit hypothesized that ratable payment could also mean that holdout 
creditors would need to be paid the same percentage of the total that was being paid to 
exchange bondholders. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 255.  This means that if an interest 
payment to bondholders constitutes 1 percent of the total amount owed under principal and 
interest, then the holdout creditors would need to be paid 1 percent of the total amount owed 
to them. Id. 
 281. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *3. 
 282. Id. 
 283. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Republic of Argentina at 26, NML Capital, No. 
14-2689-cv(L), 2012 WL 6777133 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012), ECF No. 657. 
 284. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *1. 
 285. The court has estimated that $40 billion of reserves would be adequate to cover 
payment, however, Argentina contends that only $28 billion are currently in reserves. See 
Letter from Argentina to Judge Griesa at 2, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG) 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 708. 
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equally.286  The restructured debt resulting from Argentina’s default was 
also issued under several currencies and different governing laws.  Due to 
the complexities of the restructuring, several clarification motions have 
been filed.287  Many of these proceedings are still ongoing, however, the 
court has taken a broad view of the injunctions, generally declining to “start 
making important exceptions to the basic ruling and Injunction.”288 
c.   U.S. Government Response and Aftermath 
Failure to comply with the injunctions has already led Argentina to a 
technical default in restructured foreign law bonds.289  Additionally, the 
court orders have produced new claimants seeking “me-too” injunctive 
orders for pre- and post-judgment actions.290  In a letter to the court, 
Argentina stated that twenty-five suits had been filed from June through 
November of 2014, totaling approximately $1.8 billion in principal and $4.7 
billion in judgments.291  In addition to increasing Argentina-related 
litigation, reliance on NML Capital already has been cited as the basis for 
other sovereign litigation and enforcement matters regarding the pari passu 
clause.292 
Although the United States had filed a statement of interest seeking a 
Second Circuit rehearing by claiming that the court had incorrectly decided 
the issue,293 when the rehearing petition was denied and the Supreme Court 
declined to hear the issue, the orders were final.294  Despite the 
characterization of the pari passu clause as boilerplate by some scholars 
who believe it carries a distinctive standard industry usage that is counter to 
the interpretation put forward by U.S. courts, the ratable payment 
interpretation remains New York law. 
To counteract the rulings, Congress has the ability to enact legislation 
much like Belgium did to limit the injunctive remedy.  Congress has made 
several failed attempts to pass legislation aimed at sovereign restructuring 
 286. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 241 n.9 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 287. See, e.g., Letter from Euro Bondholders to Judge Griesa at 1 & n.1, NML Capital, 
No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014), ECF No. 723 (urging decision on 
emergency motion for clarification related to euro-denominated bonds governed by English 
law that were the result of the 2005 and 2010 exchange offers); Letter from JPMorgan Chase 
Bank, N.A. to Judge Griesa at 1–2, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 
2014), ECF No. 572 (seeking clarification on treatment of transfers to yen-denominated 
bonds governed by Japanese law). 
 288. See Order at 3, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014), 
ECF No. 724 (denying clarification motion for euro bondholders). 
 289. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 290. Letter from Argentina to Judge Griesa, supra note 285, at 1. 
 291. Id. at 1 n.1. 
 292. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 192 (mentioning “copycat lawsuit” as 
evidence that NML ruling is not unique to Argentina’s specific circumstances). See 
generally Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, No. 13 Civ. 1450 (HB), 
2013 WL 4414875, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013). 
 293. See generally U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 271. 
 294. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
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both to aid creditors in collecting and to allow sovereign debtors freedom 
from vulture fund investors.295  The inability to gain enough support on 
either side of the issue is evidence of the lack of political will to change the 
status quo and indicates that legislative enactment is unlikely to be an 
effective means of altering the effect of the decisions.296 
3.   English Bonds and Interpretation 
Along with New York law, English law is the other primary choice of 
law for governing foreign-issued sovereign bonds.297  It is therefore 
relevant to examine how the pari passu clause is understood there as well as 
market reactions to the contract provisions.  This section first discusses 
several differentiating characteristics between sovereign bonds under 
English law and those under New York law.  Then, this section discusses a 
conflict of law question raised by an ongoing case and some implications of 
such a conflict. 
In keeping with the public policy reasons for preventing holdout creditors 
from souring a debt workout, there have been several mutations to the pari 
passu clause governed by English law.  Generally, the variations have 
adopted language that permits priorities in payment that are required or 
permitted under the borrower’s local law.298  This means that if a 
borrower’s local law permits a payment preference to a subset of unsecured 
creditors, that payment will not violate the pari passu clause.299  The pari 
passu language that dictates protection of legislatively enacted preference 
allowance has been increasingly used in England, and indicates that pari 
passu “has become less focused on involuntary subordination over time.”300  
Additionally, the long-standing inclusion of CACs in English law sovereign 
bonds has meant that holdout creditors traditionally retain less leverage in a 
restructuring than do their counterparts where CACs have been less 
prevalent.301 
English bonds are also typically structured under a trust indenture, where 
a trustee represents the interests of bondholders and can decide whether to 
initiate holdout enforcement proceedings on their behalf.302  As compared 
to the New York system of using fiscal agency agreements where the fiscal 
agent represents the issuer and therefore lacks any restriction on individual 
 295. Compare Stop Very Unscrupulous Loan Transfers from Underprivileged Countries 
to Rich, Exploitive [VULTURE] Funds Act, H.R. 2932, 111th Cong. § 2(8) (2009), with 
Judgment Evading Foreign States Accountability Act of 2010, H.R. 5564, 111th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 2009). 
 296. See John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures:  NML Capital v. Republic of 
Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1671, 
1697–99 (2014). 
 297. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 4–5. 
 298. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 133. 
 299. See id. 
 300. Id. at 134. 
 301. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of CACs and 
their tradition of inclusion in English law–governed bonds). 
 302. Koch, supra note 34, at 678. 
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holdout suits, the English trust structure limits the ability to bring individual 
actions.303  English law limits holdout creditors’ access to litigation over 
the bond terms because it prioritizes successful restructuring over providing 
remedies to holdout creditors.304 
While England has taken these measures to address concerns in its own 
legal system, U.S. court remedies for pari passu breach affect bonds 
governed under English law.  When Argentina conducted a bond 
restructuring of its 1994 FAA, euro-denominated bonds that were to be 
governed under English law were issued pursuant to the indenture that was 
the result of the exchange that occurred in 2005.305  Under the indenture, 
Bank of New York Mellon became trustee of the euro-denominated 
bonds.306  As a result of actions brought to enforce the pari passu clause of 
the original FAA under New York law,307 injunctions prevented payment to 
any of the bondholders resulting from the exchange of FAA bonds until 
Argentina made a ratable payment in principal and interest to the holdout 
creditors.308  This extended to Bank of New York Mellon and sought to 
prevent the transfer of funds to the euro bondholders, which would violate 
the Bank of New York Mellon’s contractual obligations under English 
law.309 
In Knighthead Master Fund LP v. The Bank of New York Mellon,310 euro 
bondholders brought suit in England seeking declaratory judgments to 
address obligations under English law in light of these rulings and to 
understand whether a foreign court could alter a contract governed under 
English law.311  While the Knighthead case is still ongoing,312 it raises 
important questions on the meaning of the pari passu clause under English 
law and on the reach of remedies sought under NML Capital by the U.S. 
courts, which in turn raises a major conflict of law issue.313 
 303. See id. at 681–85. 
 304. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 22, at 1324. 
 305. See Knighthead Master Fund LP v. The Bank of New York Mellon [2014] EWHC 
3662 (Ch), [2]–[4] (Eng.); see also Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1684 (noting the 
“twist” that occurred by having bonds governed by both New York and English law covered 
under the same trust indenture). 
 306. Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶ 5. 
 307. See supra notes 264–88 and accompanying text. 
 308. See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 
2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), aff’d, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML 
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 309. See Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶¶ 18, 20. 
 310. [2014] EWHC 3662 (Ch), [2]–[4] (Eng.). 
 311. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 312. The Court permitted a window for holdout creditors from the New York action to 
intervene. Id. ¶ 28.  NML Capital declined to participate in the action. Letter from NML 
Capital to Judge Griesa at 1, No. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2014), ECF No. 
725.  The euro bondholder matter covers interest payments in the sum of €226 million. 
Nishant Kumar, London Court Seeks Argentina Creditors’ Say on Debt Payments, REUTERS 
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/06/argentina-debt-idUSL4N0SW 
70420141106. 
 313. Compare Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶ 19, with Order at 3, NML Capital, No. 
08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014), ECF No. 724. 
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The Knighthead order explicitly notes that the Financial Markets Law 
Committee expressed that the pari passu clause would likely be interpreted 
differently under English law, and there would be a different remedial 
approach under English law.314  In the New York district court order 
preventing the transfer of funds to exchange bondholders, the judge 
expressly absolved any bank of liability under the indenture governing the 
exchange bonds.315  The English court stated that while such an order may 
allow the bank to avoid liability under U.S. law, it is “hard to see how it can 
do so in the eyes of the English Courts, and the bonds in question are 
governed by English law.”316 
Before the Knighthead case, there was already discussion of the 
differences between contract interpretation according to English law and the 
method articulated in NML Capital.  Similarly to the way that Sharon Steel 
interprets boilerplate bond language as a matter of law, English contract 
interpretation follows a market understanding approach so that where 
multiple meanings might arise from the bond language, the market 
understanding can guide the determination of the parties’ intentions at the 
time of contract execution.317 
Pursuant to a review of pari passu clauses by the English Financial 
Markets Law Committee, it was determined that the language could give 
rise to two alternative interpretations.318  First, pari passu could express 
equal legal ranking and was included to prevent sovereigns from legally 
subordinating one group of creditors by engaging in preferential legal 
treatment to another.319  Second, pari passu could be a promise to pay all 
obligations pro rata when a debtor is unable to pay them all in full.320  The 
committee concluded that under English law the traditionally understood 
meaning would be that of ensuring only legally equal ranking and 
treatment.321  The trend in contract interpretation under English law to 
value the market understanding of the parties, where such a market 
understanding has been widely articulated, suggests that compared to the 
New York courts, the English courts would find a disparate interpretation 
stemming from the same clause.322 
 314. Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶ 9. 
 315. Id. ¶¶ 13–14. 
 316. Id. 
 317. See Lachlan Burn, Pari Passu Clauses:  English Law After NML v. Argentina, 9 
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 2, 4 (2014); see also supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
 318. Burn, supra note 317, at 4. 
 319. Id.  This view is consistent with the standard industry usage argument propounded 
by opponents of the NML and Elliott interpretation in the United States. See generally 
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163. 
 320. Burn, supra note 317, at 4. 
 321. Id. at 5. 
 322. See Tolek N. Petch, NML v. Argentina in an English Legal Setting, 9 CAP. MKTS. 
L.J. 266, 267–69 (2014); accord Gregory R. Day, Market Failure, Pari Passu, and the Law 
and Economics Approach to the Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 TUL J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 242 
n.102 (2014). 
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B.   Proposed Solutions:  Why Deeply Engrained Market Failures 
Bar a Simple Problem-Solving Mechanism 
In response to the unraveling legal saga and the fear that NML Capital 
will encourage increasing vulture fund activity, several proposals have been 
put forward to prevent holdout creditors from using the pari passu clause to 
disrupt a restructuring.  Of particular concern are the economic risks and 
consequences of serial defaults and long-term exclusion from the capital 
markets.323  The proposed remedies have come in myriad forms but 
generally focus on creating a governing sovereign bankruptcy regime or 
implementing a contractual solution. 
The modern characteristics of sovereign bond debt and the evolution of 
sovereign enforcement jurisprudence have created a complex role for the 
pari passu clause.324  This section looks at alternative proposals for 
preventing vulture investors from using pari passu as a way to disrupt 
restructurings, discusses the ways in which these solutions reach the heart 
of the market failure, and addresses barriers to successful implementation. 
1.   ICMA Solution 
The International Capital Market Association (ICMA) represents more 
than 470 investment banks, asset managers, and debt issuers who are 
located across fifty-five countries.325  In August 2014, an ICMA working 
group created a standardized pari passu clause that could be placed into 
bond documents as a contractual solution to the holdout creditor disruption 
of restructurings.326  The contractual fix is in a proviso to the pari passu 
clause that specifically denies any obligation to make ratable payments to 
other external indebtedness, particularly excepting any form of conditioning 
payment on notes based on payment to other obligations.327  The purpose of 
the particular language chosen was a result of an initiative to “minimi[z]e or 
indeed, completely eradicate, the potential for holdout creditors to block or 
 323. See, e.g., Charlie Devereux & Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez, Argentina Will Repay Paris 
Club Debt 13 Years After Default, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 29, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-29/argentina-agrees-to-repay-9-7-billion-to-paris-
club-creditors.html.  Argentina’s inability to return to debt sustainability because of trouble 
accessing capital markets, high interest rates, currency devaluation (the peso has weakened 
by 35 percent since 2002), and massive costs in arbitration and litigation serve as potent 
examples of the impact judicial proceedings can have on a sovereign. Id. 
 324. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 163 (“[The] sheer number of complicating 
factors that distinguish the sovereign debt case study from other areas of transactional 
practice suggests caution in offering lessons for the future.”). 
 325. Membership, ICMA, http://www.icmagroup.org/membership/ (last visited Feb. 23, 
2015). 
 326. Sovereign Debt Information:  Standard Pari Passu Provisions for the Terms and 
Conditions of Sovereign Notes, ICMA (Aug. 2014), http://www.icmagroup.org/ 
resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/. 
 327. Id. (supporting a standard pari passu clause proviso that reads:  “provided, however, 
that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time 
with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no 
obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying 
sums due on the Notes and vice versa”). 
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frustrate a more universal approach to sovereign debt restructuring” in the 
wake of NML Capital.328 
2.   IMF Solution 
Previous attempts by the IMF to establish an overarching bankruptcy 
measure called the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) have 
been unsuccessful over the last decade.329  Then, in October 2014, the IMF 
proposed substantial changes to sovereign bond language.330  The purpose 
of the contractual measure is to dissuade vulture funds from investing in 
underperforming debt by reducing their remedies following a default.331  To 
temper the fear that the New York court decisions will exacerbate collective 
action problems in future restructurings, the proposed pari passu reform 
explicitly excludes the obligation to make ratable payments to holdout 
creditors.332  The proposal advocates for changes consistent with the ICMA 
suggested language.333  The IMF report finds particular need for expedient 
implementation of contractual reforms given:  (1) the finality of the NML 
Capital decision following denial of Supreme Court review, (2) the tension 
between the NML Capital interpretation and the alternative, “well-
established” view of pari passu being solely about pure legal subordination, 
and (3) the potential harm pari passu injunctive relief can have as a broadly 
applicable remedy and incentive for holdouts.334  Additionally, the report 
touches on the notion that English courts would likely decline to follow the 
New York courts’ precedent.335 
3.   ICSID Role 
The World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), an international arbitration tribunal, established 
jurisdiction over a sovereign debt proceeding and the first mass arbitration 
(with over 180,000 claimants) when it heard Abaclat v. Argentine Republic 




 329. See SCHIER, supra note 35, at 44 (discussing failure of SDRM as a result of “political 
resistance in the international community”); see also Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 
1649–51 (detailing failures of the SDRM proposal in the context of international 
organizations seeking widespread use of CACs as a “second best” market fix once SDRM 
appeared infeasible). 
 330. See generally IMF, STRENGTHENING THE CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (Oct. 2014), available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf. 
 331. Id. 
 332. See id. at 4, 15. 
 333. Id. at 14–15. 
 334. See id. at 7–12.  Uncertainty also results from the way courts would apply the course 
of conduct analysis—finding pari passu breach only in narrow circumstances that mimic the 
actions taken by Argentina or in broader instances. Id. at 11. 
 335. Id. at 13. 
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in 2011.336  While many touted this accomplishment as the long-awaited 
overarching sovereign debt restructuring mechanism,337 subsequent arbitral 
adjudication efforts were plagued by similar problems experienced in the 
court system—lack of true sovereign enforcement power and protracted 
proceedings.338  Claims stemming from the Greek debt restructuring are 
now before the ICSID, but the effectiveness and feasibility of a successful 
resolution will only come to light as the matter progresses.339 
4.   Implementation 
The Republic of Kazakhstan was the first country to implement 
contractual changes to the pari passu clause340 by fully implementing the 
ICMA recommendations to its issuance of $2.5 billion of ten- and thirty-
year bonds that it began marketing in October 2014.341  The bonds, which 
are the first overseas dollar-denominated offering from the country in 
fourteen years, could serve as a positive example of the suggested language 
reforms.342  Although this change could signal a new era in bond offerings, 
the relative size (compared to Argentina’s $95 billion default) makes 
implementation easier than with larger nations. 
One barrier to implementation is that each country must adopt reforms 
individually.  Contract changes only will be influential if the language 
becomes incorporated on a large scale in sovereign bonds going forward.  
While several countries have already included new language with no 
significant price impact,343 to be effective it would need to be in every 
bond.344  Given one characterization of the pari passu clause as boilerplate, 
 336. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisionon 
Jurisdiction.pdf. 
 337. See Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Note, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass 
Claims Arbitration before the ICSID, The Abaclat Case, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 505 (2012), 
http://www.harvardilj.org/2012/09/sovereign-debt-restructuring-and-mass-claims-
arbitration-before-the-icsid-the-abaclat-case/; Jan Asmus Bischoff, The End of Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring, TRANSNATIONAL NOTES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/ 
transnational/2011/10/the-end-of-sovereign-debt-restructuring/. 
 338. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Italian Holders of Argentine Sovereign Bonds in 
Support of Respondents at 11–12, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., No. 13-990, 
2014 WL 1878054 (May 7, 2014) (noting the arbitral award has remained unpaid by 
Argentina); Decision, supra note 336, at 7 (noting request for arbitration dated 2006, five 
years prior to the decision). 
 339. See Yanying Li, Policy Implication of PoŠtová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over 
Sovereign Bonds:  Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration, 23 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 
NL ART. 6 (2014). 
 340. Kazakhstan is an innovator in the sovereign bond market.  In 1997, the developing 
nation defied the standard unanimous consent contract by permitting a 75 percent majority of 
bondholders to change key financial terms. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1628 n.1. 
 341. See Katia Porzecanski & Lyubov Pronina, Kazakhstan Sells First Overseas Dollar 
Bonds in 14 Years, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2014-10-06/kazakhstan-sells-first-overseas-dollar-bonds-in-14-years.html. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Mexico, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan have all included new pari passu language in 
recent bond offerings. See Hagan, supra note 10. 
 344. See id. 
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and the fact that language was not significantly altered after the Elliott case, 
it would seem that other market conditions will be determinative of whether 
bond drafting will incorporate the new language.345  Still, this would not 
have any impact on the approximately $900 billion in sovereign bonds that 
do not contain the new clauses.346  Many of these do not mature for another 
ten years.347 
III.   A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PARI PASSU 
This part explores the insufficiency of proposed solutions, synthesizes 
the current state of the law, and advocates for a solution that seeks to limit 
vulture fund disruption without leaving traditional creditors unprotected in 
the event of an opportunistic default or oppressive restructuring. 
Preventing sovereign debtors from fully restructuring and therefore 
condemning them to never-ending litigation with holdouts and limited or no 
access to capital markets is not a sustainable model.  Though there are many 
claims that the situation in Argentina was an anomaly, and simply a result 
of a “uniquely recalcitrant debtor,”348 the broad interpretation of the pari 
passu clause and the specific wording in the orders suggest that NML 
Capital’s precedential value will extend well beyond the specific 
circumstances of the case.  Such precedent will certainly be difficult to 
distinguish in future cases where bonds governed by New York law contain 
similar pari passu clauses.  Given the trends in sovereign default it is not 
likely that Argentina will be the last nation to face this issue.349  On the 
other hand, because of the high prevalence of sovereign defaults there is a 
need for some sort of deterrence mechanism that emphasizes the severity of 
a default and serves as a deterrent to overborrowing by promoting fiscal 
responsibility and creditor protection from coercive restructuring terms. 
A.   Why Proposed Solutions Are Insufficient 
When looking at the proposals discussed in Part II.B, two vulnerabilities 
are apparent.  First, there is no incentive for uniform implementation.  
There are many reasons why a sovereign might be reluctant to alter standard 
contract terms, even faulty ones.350  Given transaction costs associated with 
such changes, a sovereign that is 100 percent certain that it will be able to 
fully pay its creditors would not need to prioritize altering bond language.  
Therefore, those sovereigns that are first to make the changes could signal 
debt obligation insecurity that might result in increased lending costs.  As a 
check against sovereign debtors, however, such a result might bring 
positive changes to sovereign borrowing habits by preventing 
 345. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text. 
 348. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 349. See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text. 
 350. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of language 
change following the Elliott decision). 
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overborrowing if cost of funds increase.351  In aggregate, there would need 
to be an overall umbrella organization or incentive system to compel 
sovereigns to make the contract changes.  Otherwise, selective 
implementation might not only create the aforementioned price volatility, 
but it would be ineffective in eliminating the problem of holdout litigation 
stemming from pari passu injunctive relief unless a critical mass of 
committed sovereigns was established.  As seen with the SDRM and ICSID 
frameworks, overarching regimes have either been unable to come to 
fruition or have not proved to be an adequate alternative to the status 
quo.352  Even a smaller-scale collective created solely to incentivize 
widespread contract language implementation likely would present some of 
the same difficulties. 
Another lingering problem beyond the issue of actual implementation 
and market response is the question of how to handle bonds that have been 
issued under the old language, and therefore are subject to existing law on 
pari passu interpretation.  Solving problems for future restructurings is 
certainly a step in the right direction, but it leaves billions of dollars of debt 
subject to the same conflicting legal problems that were discussed in Parts I 
and II of this Note.  Any sort of overarching solution that would solve the 
pari passu problem altogether would therefore require a two-pronged 
remedy aimed both at future bond offerings and at those currently in 
existence that are vulnerable to the holdout creditor problem. 
B.   The Law As It Stands 
The New York interpretation of the pari passu clause as a ratable 
payment provision is the current law.353  The Second Circuit affirmed 
injunctive relief, and the Supreme Court has denied a petition to review the 
decision.354  As the law currently stands, the ratable payment interpretation 
invites a remedy for injunctive relief to use third-party intermediary banks 
to prevent payments to a restructured class until the holdout creditors are 
paid.355  The only way that judicial interpretation might change is if another 
action is brought before the court that has different pari passu language.356  
Given the broad scope of the ratable payment interpretation and the broad 
injunctive remedy provided, this does not seem likely.357  Congress also has 
the ability to limit injunctive relief in enforcement, however that seems 
unlikely as well due to polarized political views on the balance of 
incentives to ensure sovereign debt sustainability while maintaining 
bondholder remedies to enforce payment.358 
 351. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 70, 329, 347–50 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 256–91 and accompanying text.  The interpretation would not, 
however, be binding on outside circuit courts or on New York state courts. 
 354. See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 356. See supra notes 16–17, 334 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 252–89, 292 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 293–96 and accompanying text. 
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The Knighthead determination359 will be important.  If the English court 
rules that Bank of New York Mellon is not exempt from liability to service 
payment to euro bondholders, and therefore must perform under the 
exchange bond contract, it would create a body of law that runs counter to 
the ratable payment interpretation.  It would incentivize a country that seeks 
to restructure debt governed by New York law to restructure under English 
law in euro-denominated bonds so that it is beyond the pari passu 
interpretation subject to enforcement by New York courts.360 
It cannot be the case that by restructuring bonds partially in foreign 
currency and governed by foreign law that those exchange bondholders get 
paid in full while the holders of U.S. law bonds denominated in dollars are 
held up until holdouts get paid.  Such a practical application of the law 
would necessarily lead to a certain breach of any understood meaning of 
pari passu because it would create completely arbitrary unequal treatment of 
creditors who are in fact part of the same restructured class. 
C.   Limiting Vultures Without Disrupting Holdout Balance 
A proper solution to the holdout creditor disruption of sovereign bond 
restructurings needs to strike a balance between limiting vulture fund 
investing strategies while also creating an internal control for concerns of 
fairness and safeguarding creditor rights, particularly in the event of an 
opportunistic default. 
1.   Infeasibility of a Sovereign Bankruptcy Structure 
Creating a bankruptcy regime to govern the distribution of payments in a 
sovereign default would solve the problem of pari passu.  Having one 
centralized framework to work out all creditor issues and thereafter allow 
the sovereign debtor to be free of restructuring disruption would create the 
ideal scenario for a sovereign to gain a fresh start.  This approach, however, 
would not be feasible because of a number of practical concerns.  First, a 
successful sovereign bankruptcy structure would require the participation of 
all nations.361  Second, it would require enforcement capabilities, without 
which compliance with payment determinations would be voluntary and 
therefore essentially useless.362 
Much like in the U.S. bankruptcy system, the bankruptcy court would 
need to hold exclusive jurisdiction on such matters and also the ability to 
enforce any money judgments or awards.  Given the fact that sovereignty is 
highly valued under principles of foreign sovereign immunity and comity, it 
 359. See supra notes 311–16 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 311–22 and accompanying text (describing the potential conflict-of-
law issue in addition to analysis of how pari passu would be interpreted under English law). 
 361. See KRUEGER, supra note 73, at 33–34 (discussing the importance of uniformity and 
an exclusive jurisdiction for a single international judicial entity to avoid fragmented dispute 
resolution). 
 362. See supra notes 99–128 (explaining many ways that creditors can take advantage of 
the voluntary bond exchange process); supra note 338 (illustrating, in the ICSID case, how a 
sovereign debtor can take advantage of essentially voluntary compliance). 
 
2015] SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE 2211 
would be impossible to have a successful regime without each nation 
waiving some large degree of sovereignty.  Many nations would likely be 
reluctant to do so, and in the event of an unfavorable ruling, would likely 
have difficulty with compliance measures.  Such avoidance of unfavorable 
rulings already has been seen in the ICSID issues with Argentina.363  
Additionally, the IMF’s SDRM proposal never was able to get off the 
ground.364  The failure of that attempt was not for a lack of political 
visibility or effort on the part of the IMF.365  Despite much public visibility 
of the issues and many attempts to create an overarching framework, none 
has been successfully implemented to date.366  Scholars have written on 
ways to alter a bankruptcy framework to address discrete barriers, yet there 
has been no significant headway.367  This seems to suggest that at least as 
to how the market is currently situated, a bankruptcy regime therefore 
would not be the most efficient or expedient measure to create a resolution 
on the pari passu issue. 
2.   Contractual Solution 
Given the difficulties in creating an overarching sovereign bankruptcy 
regime, a contractual solution to the problem likely would be the most 
pragmatic solution to prevent pari passu interference going forward.  It 
would allow the language to be tailored to the purpose of preventing vulture 
fund holdout creditors from interfering with payment on exchange bonds 
but without removing creditor rights that are otherwise essential for a 
functioning market.  While the contractual solutions proposed in Part II.B 
address some of these concerns, there are two reasons why they are 
incomplete solutions. 
First, the proposed contractual language creates an imbalance of creditor 
rights by stripping holdouts of their right to hold out and litigate for the full 
value of the claims under pari passu.368  Although provisions to that effect 
have been successfully included in several sovereign bond offerings without 
significant price variation, the widespread inclusion of such terms runs the 
risk of preventing creditor quid pro quo that could negatively impact their 
ability to bargain during a restructuring.369  Second, it does nothing to 
address the nearly $900 billion in outstanding bonds that do not include a 
newly crafted pari passu clause.  Even bonds that contain CACs are at 
increased risk of pari passu litigation because vulture funds can purchase a 
 363. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 329 and 
accompanying text. 
 368. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (including language that “the Issuer shall 
have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) . . . to any such other external 
indebtedness”). 
 369. See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (comparing balance of power 
between creditors and debtors in a domestic bankruptcy context to the leverage each brings 
to the table in a voluntary restructuring). 
 
2212 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
large enough share to block a majority or create additional reasons for other 
creditors to hold out in a restructuring.370  This Note argues that a 
contractual solution “plus” is the best workaround to fixing the uncertainty 
of the pari passu clause.  Such a contractual solution “plus” includes a 
contractual solution in conjunction with a remedy for outstanding bonds. 
a.   Ninety-Day Presumption Proviso 
Given the fact that the vulture fund investment strategy is to purchase 
large quantities of defaulted or near-defaulted bonds on the secondary 
market and then hold out in a restructuring, a proviso to the pari passu 
clause should be included to limit equal treatment for those activities.  The 
aftermath of the vulture fund victories in Elliott and NML Capital evoke a 
sense of unfairness at the idea that such investors can purchase large 
quantities of sovereign bonds at a deep discount and then halt payment on 
the restructured bonds when a majority of creditors accepted the reduced 
terms.  Based on the language of the pari passu clause and the use of pro 
rata distribution in domestic bankruptcy,371 if the clause is to have a 
meaning, it must mean that all bonds from the same issuance should be 
treated equally to protect creditors (though the metric to determine equality 
still remains a murky subject area).  The ratable payment interpretation, 
however, clearly holds value as an enforcement tool for creditors and 
should not be so quickly stripped from a creditor’s protective leverage in a 
restructuring. 
In order to limit pari passu injunctive relief for vulture funds only, a 
contractual proviso should be aimed at what differentiates them from other 
investors—the timing of bond purchase coupled with the intention to hold 
out.  A proper contractual proviso would state that the bonds rank pari 
passu among themselves and other current and future external indebtedness 
provided that the bonds were purchased on or before ninety days prior to 
the announcement of default or restructuring.  The concept of a ninety-day 
period is borrowed from section 547 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that deals 
with avoidance of intercreditor preferences that disadvantage unsecured 
creditors.372  While the analogy to section 547 is imperfect because 
voidable preferences are concerned with transfer of the debtor’s property 
whereas in the sovereign debt context the issue is with purchases made by a 
creditor, the policy considerations for protection of the general body of 
 370. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1093–95 (finding disadvantages of CACs 
include limitation to restructure bonds beyond a particular bond issue and the inability to 
“eliminate the strategic use of litigation”); see also Koch, supra note 34, at 684 (finding the 
ratable payment interpretation of pari passu has “potential to effectively unhinge CACs”). 
 371. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of a ninety-day 
period in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a presumption that the debtor is insolvent during that 
period, and to avoid preferential transfer of assets to creditors during that period that would 
give them a priority over other unsecured creditors).  There are benefits and costs to having a 
bright line rule.  Although such a rule produces a consistent and predictable standard, it 
could be subject to manipulation in this context particularly because sovereign entry into 
restructuring is characteristically much different from corporate bankruptcy. 
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unsecured creditors remain the same.  Like a preference, a sovereign bond 
sale made during a time when the sovereign is in financial distress to a 
vulture investor that is certain to hold out and seek injunctive relief 
constitutes an event that makes creditors overall worse off. 
The ninety-day period would act to decrease the incentive of vulture 
funds to invest, but permit smaller retail investors to hold out and seek the 
full value of their claims in an unfair or highly coercive restructuring.  
Additionally, providing such a ninety-day period would create an incentive 
for sovereign debtors to address unsustainable debt burdens before the 
sovereign becomes entangled in a crisis.  Such incentives for preemptive 
restructuring would address concerns that sovereigns tend to postpone an 
announcement of default, causing the sovereign to restructure too late.373  
By engaging in an earlier restructuring, sovereigns can avoid substantial 
value loss and increase the chances of a successful restructuring.374 
While suspending a pari passu remedy for vulture funds might otherwise 
have adverse effects on the liquidity flows to the secondary bond market,375 
the ability to seek a judgment for contract breach and execute a subsequent 
order of attachment would not be impaired.376  There also would be no 
limitation on purchasers of the distressed sovereign debt seeking to 
participate in a restructuring.  Additionally, because such a proviso would 
reduce the risk of vulture fund holdouts while still retaining a check on 
opportunistic default for traditional creditors, the inclusion of such a clause 
should not result in a decrease in market value and could in fact increase the 
value of the debt.377  In contrast to the issue of implementation with 
existing proposed contractual solutions,378 the proviso would create market 
incentives for inclusion and would have fewer barriers to widespread use. 
b.   The Outstanding Bond Issue:  The “Plus” Factor 
In addressing the billions of dollars in outstanding foreign law–governed 
bonds, the remedy should either come from legislative enactment or from 
sovereign debt restructuring strategy. 
i.   Legislative Limitations Unlikely 
On the one hand, Congress has competing interests in ensuring that there 
is adequate pushback on opportunistic default and less pressure for 
 373. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 2, 
11–12 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/ 
10/sovereign%20bankruptcy/ciepr_2013_revisitingsovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf. 
 374. Id. 
 375. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 377. Cf. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1093–94 (concluding that a contractual 
approach which both solves the collective action problems and reduces the risk of holdouts 
should raise the value of the debt so long as the solution is not expected to “increase the 
likelihood of opportunistic defaults”). 
 378. See supra notes 368–70 and accompanying text. 
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bondholders to take a large haircut.379  On the other hand, there is an 
interest in permitting countries to begin anew after restructuring and not be 
dragged through years of debilitating litigation that strains the economy and 
prevents return to capital markets.380 
The political will is not likely to emerge in the near future to put forth 
federal legislation like the Belgian law preventing injunctive relief.381  
Another way that Congress could act to disincentivize vulture fund 
investing could be to pass legislation stating that, in the event of sovereign 
default or restructuring, pro rata payment would be limited to the actual 
payment price on the bond and not the full face value.382  The result of such 
action, while likely being successful to deter vulture fund investing, would 
also chill the secondary market and would therefore be overbroad. 
The New York state legislature also has the ability to alter the bounds of 
equitable relief permitted by the courts.  As the cause of action originates 
under New York law, it might even seem most appropriate for any 
legislative solution to originate at the state level.383  Previous successful 
lobbying attempts by vulture funds, however, indicate that any statutory 
solution limiting holdout remedies is not likely to come to fruition.384 
ii.   Creative Interpretation:  Purposeful Avoidance 
One unfortunate reality is that the best option for sovereign debtors to 
avoid conflict with pari passu interpretation for outstanding bonds is to 
purposely avoid New York jurisdiction in the event of a restructuring.  The 
Knighthead case is still ongoing, though it appears that the English courts 
will interpret pari passu not as a ratable payment understanding but rather a 
pure legal subordination interpretation, informed by the “traditional” market 
understanding of pari passu’s functionality.385  What that means is that if 
any of the bonds currently governed under New York law become 
unsustainable debt, the sovereign should restructure all of its debt under 
foreign law and in foreign currency, likely under English law.  Because the 
clearing agents and disbursement mechanisms also would be under foreign 
law, the court in New York would lack the remedy of injunctive relief 
because the third-party intermediary would be beyond the reach of the 
court’s jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note explores the sovereign bond market, the restructuring process, 
and the role of the pari passu clause.  It discusses various interpretations of 
 379. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text. 
 380. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text. 
 381. See supra notes 294–95; see also supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
 382. Compare supra notes 151–55 and accompanying text (discussing vulture fund 
purchases of bonds at a reduction of face value), with supra notes 66–67, 112–17 and 
accompanying text (discussing face value reduction generally in the context of an exchange). 
 383. See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra note 205. 
 385. See supra notes 314–22 and accompanying text. 
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the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds, remedies that are associated with 
those understandings, and the legal issues which are presented in the 
restructuring context.  This Note examines several proposals for reducing 
restructuring disruption by holdout creditors.  These have not adequately 
addressed the problem of the outstanding bonds or the protection of non-
vulture creditors’ rights.  The primary proposal put forth by this Note—a 
contractual provision that would limit pari passu injunctive relief for bonds 
purchased within the ninety days before a default or restructuring 
announcement and also incentivize sovereign borrowers to initiate 
restructuring negotiations sooner—serves the interests of both debtors and 
creditors.  Additionally, assuming Congress will not act to limit the scope 
of the current judicial interpretation of the pari passu clause, the best 
strategy for outstanding bonds is to restructure the interpretation of pari 
passu under another jurisdiction’s law (whether English or otherwise) so 
that it will not risk blocking payment to exchange bondholders. 
 
